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I.

INTRODUCTION

When a federally insured bank fails, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC") typically intervenes to protect depositors. As part of the bailout, the FDIC undertakes the
role of liquidator of the bank's assets, both physical and intangible. A bank's intangible assets consist primarily of its loan
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portfolio, that is, its rights to receive repayment from borrowers. A failed bank's loan portfolio is packed with "troubled"
loans, which are of doubtful collectibility for a variety of reasons. In most cases, the borrower is insolvent and simply cannot repay the loan. In other cases, the bank's right to repayment is subject to offset or reduction because the borrower has
a valid defense against the bank. For example, a borrower may
contend that he is relieved from his obligation to repay his loan
on grounds that he lacked mental capacity to contract, or that
the bank defrauded him. When the FDIC acquires a loan following a bank's failure, a borrower will assert this defense
against the FDIC. This Article analyzes the governing rules
under which the FDIC can acquire the power to collect the loan
free of the borrower's defenses.
The FDIC acquires loans by transfer in the course of carrying out its statutory function as liquidator. Ordinarily, a transferee of an intangible property right, such as the right to receive repayment of loaned money (an "obligation"), acquires the
right subject to defenses available under the loan agreement
between the party who promised to pay (the "obligor") and the
party who bargained for such payment (the "obligee"). The
transferee's interest is also subject to any defense or claim the
obligor had against the obligee that accrued before the obligor
received notification of the transfer.1 Thus, the transferee of an
obligation generally does not obtain rights against the obligor
greater than those of the original obligee.2 A transferee who is
a holder in due course,' however, takes free from virtually all
the obligor's claims or defenses. 4
1 U.C.C. § 9-318(1) cmt. 1 (1990). See generally, Grant Gilmore, The Assign-

ee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217 (1964)
(examining the protections afforded an assignee of contract rights against defenses arising under the contract, and from the contracting parties' subsequent
acts).
2 The purchaser of an intangible property right receives less protection than
a purchaser of goods. A good-faith purchaser of goods takes free of the true
owner's claims if the purchaser obtained voidable, as opposed to void, title from
his seller. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1990). See generally, Grant Gilmore, The
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase,63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954) (describing the historical genesis of special rights of the good faith purchaser).
' Under U.C.C. § 3-302, a transferee must: (1) be a holder; (2) of a negotiable instrument; (3) acquired for value; (4)in good faith; and (5) without notice
of claims or defenses. U.C.C. § 3-302 (1990).
4 See U.C.C. § 3-305 (1990). The 1990 Official Text of the U.C.C. reflects
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The FDIC, as transferee of assets in the form of obligations
owed to a failed bank, normally does not satisfy all of the requirements to receive immunity as a holder in due course conventionally defined.5 It would, therefore, acquire no greater
rights than those the failed bank had against the borrower.
Under the emerging federal law, however, the FDIC is immune
from certain claims and defenses raised by an obligor even
though they would be valid against an ordinary transferee.
Federal law governing the FDIC's immunity derives from
common law and statute. The Supreme Court first awarded
immunity to the FDIC in D'Oench, Duhurme & Co. v. FDIC.' In
that case, the Court estopped an obligor from asserting as a
defense against the FDIC that the failed bank orally agreed
never to enforce the obligor's promissory note. The court reasoned that, as a matter of federal common law, invalidating the
use of such a defense against the FDIC would "protect [the
FDIC], and the public funds which it administers against misrepresentations as to the securities or other assets in the portfolios of the banks which [the FDIC] insures or to which it
makes loans."7 This principle of estoppel applied in favor of the
FDIC has come to be known as the "D'Oench doctrine."
Eight years after this decision, Congress created statutory
immunity for the FDIC as part of a revision to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act.' Section 1823(e) of the Act immunizes

substantial revisions to Article 3, which governs negotiable instruments. See

generally Fred H. Miller, The Benefits of New UCC Articles 3 and 4, 24 UCC
L.J. 99 (1991). See infra Part V.
' See discussion infra Part V concerning technical requirements for classification as a holder in due course. The FDIC typically does not qualify for holder
in due course immunity because the FDIC acquires obligations "as part of bulk
transactions not in regular course of business of the transferor," U.C.C. § 3302(c) (1990). See, e.g., Firstsouth, F-.A v. Aqua Construction, Inc., 858 F.2d
441, 442 (8th Cir. 1988) (describing application of U.C.C. § 3-302(c) as enacted
in Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-3-302(3Xc), to Federal Savings and Loan

Insurance Corporation acting as receiver for bank in suit on promissory note).
6 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
7 Id. at 457.
8 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. II 1990) (hereinafter the "Acte). FDIC v. Blue
Rock Shopping Center, 766 F.2d 744, 752-53 (3d Cir. 1985); Fred A. Miller &
Scott A. Meacham, The FDIC and Other FinancialInstitution Insurance Agencies as "Super" Holders in Due Course: A Lesson in Self-Pollinated Jurisprudence, 40 OKLA. L. REv. 621, 626-27 (1987); Robert W. Norcross, Jr., The Bank
Insolvency Game: FDIC Superpowers, the D'Oench Doctrine, and Federal Corn-
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the FDIC from certain claims and defenses an obligor may

assert against it.' Where an obligor's claim or defense is based
on an agreement to which the FDIC is not a party, it is invalid

against the FDIC unless the obligor can establish that the
agreement was, since its creation, a part of the bank's official
records.1"
Even after D'Oench and passage of § 1823(e), courts have

developed federal common law to provide the FDIC with immunity akin to that afforded a holder in due course under state

law. To be eligible for such immunity, the FDIC must: (1) acquire the obligation in connection with the resolution of a failed

bank; (2) for value; (3) in good faith; and (4) without actual
knowledge of the claim or defense." This expanded common
law doctrine has come to be known as the "federal holder in
due course rule."
To what extent should the FDIC be immune from defenses
asserted against it in its capacity as transferee of a failed
bank's assets? One might establish a rule under which the
FDIC is never immune; under such a rule, the FDIC would be
subject to all defenses a borrower might have against the failed
bank, whether or not the FDIC qualifies as a holder in due

mon Law, 103 BANKING L.J. 316, 328 (1986).
9 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) provides:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corporation in any asset acquired by it under this section or section 1821 of
this title, either as security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of
any insured depository institution, shall be valid against the Corporation
unless such agreement (1) is in writing,
(2) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an
adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously
with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or
its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of
said board or committee, and
(4) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record
of the depository institution.
1
0 See id.
" See, e.g., FDIC v. Cremona Co., 832 F.2d 959, 964 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
dismissed sub nom., Gonda v. FDIC, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988); FSLIC v. Murray,
853 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988); Southern Industrial Realty, Inc. v. Noe,
814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam); FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 161 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 87273 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).

No. 2:165]

FDIC

course, however defined. Moving toward greater immunity, one
could apply the state law holder in due course rule to the
FDIC. Under this arrangement the FDIC would be vulnerable
to the obligor's defenses unless it could establish its status as a
holder in due course, in which case it would be immune to
those defenses that are invalid against a holder in due course.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the FDIC could be absolutely immune from all defenses raised by an obligor. Somewhere between the state law rule and a rule of maximum immunity stands current federal law. The question of what level
of immunity to grant the FDIC is particularly relevant in light
of disagreement among federal courts and the large number of
cases which raise it.'
Courts have justified the FDIC's immunity as furthering a
distributional goal. Immunizing the FDIC enables it to resolve
bank failures at lower cost to the federal deposit insurance
fund. But the cost of bank failure does not evaporate when the
FDIC is immune - it simply shifts to the borrowers whose
defenses are invalidated. The impact of a rule of immunity on
the federal fisc is obviously important. Apart from redistributing the cost of bank failure, however, a rule of immunity can
reduce the loss associated with bank failure to the extent it is
efficient.'3

12

See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text. As reported by the FDIC,

bank failures increased at an alarming rate throughout the 1980s. Ten failures
were reported in 1980, 120 in 1985, and 206 in 1989. Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs of the House, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., Banking Industry in Turmoil: A Report on the Condition of the U.S. Banking Industry and the
Bank Insurance Fund 24 (Comm. Print 1990) (hereinafter "Subcomm. Report").
In addition, the number of so called "problem banks" has increased substantial-

ly since 1980. Id. The reserves of the insurance fund available to resolve bank
failures declined from apprdximately $18.3 billion in 1987 to $11.4 billion in
June 1990, reflecting the increased number of resolutions requiring cash
assistance. Id. at 21. The Subcommittee estimated that the cost of resolving
bank failures from 1990 to 1993 would range between $17 and $36 billion. Id.
at 45-46. Id. at 55. Observers have estimated that within the first four months
of 1993, failures will mount to more than one a day. Jerry Knight and Susan
Schmidt, Bush, Clinton Reluctant to Discuss Coming Wave of Bank, Thrift
Failures, THE WASH. PosT (Oct. 4, 1992).
1 Cf., e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Alloca-

tion for Consumer Payments, 66 TE. L. REV. 63 (1987) (using economic analysis
to develop an analytic framework for the efficient allocation of losses due to
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Part 11 of this Article describes the FDIC's role in bank failure resolution. Part III examines the law governing the FDIC's
immunity from obligors' claims and defenses. Part IV then
proposes an economic framework for evaluating an immunity
rule's efficiency as a loss allocation device. Part V evaluates the
holder in due course rule, a familiar and analogous loss allocation rule, concluding that it is efficient. Part VI of this Article
proposes a rule of immunity for the FDIC that efficiently allocates loss between borrowers and the FDIC.
II.

THE FDIC's ROLE IN BANK FAILURE RESOLUTION

Congress established the FDIC in 1933 in the aftermath of
financial crisis to restore public confidence in banks.1 ' In 1989,
in response to an unprecedented number of failures in the savings and loan industry, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA7).' FIRREA overhauled the federal deposit insurance
system," consolidating in the FDIC authority over deposit insurance.17 In addition to its role as deposit insurer,"' the

fraud, forgery, and error between consumers and financial institutions).

"' The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was originally created as a
part of the Federal Reserve Act by Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat.

168, which added § 12B to the Federal Reserve Act, Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6,
38 Stat. 103. Section 12B was withdrawn from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act, Act of Sept. 21, 1950, ch. 967, §2[11, 64 Stat. 873. See generally Golembe,
The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of its Antecedents
and its Purposes 75 POL. SCL Q. 181 (1960).
1' Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(hereinafter "FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 188 (1989) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
'aThe Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs described
the purposes of FIRREA as follows: "First, the legislation seeks to recapitalize

the Federal deposit insurance system and to provide for the resolution of
outstanding and anticipated failures of insured institutions. Second, the legisla-

tion seeks to preserve a safe and stable system of residential housing finance."
S. Rep. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989). See also H.R. Rep. No. 54, 101st

Cong., 1st Sess. 307-08 (1989).
"'Prior to FIRREA, the FDIC administered the Permanent Insurance Fund
("PIF") which protected federally insured depositors of federal or state chartered
banks. With FIRREA, Congress abolished the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"), which had previously served as administrator

of federal deposit insurance for savings associations. FIRREA also renamed the
insurance fund previously administered by the FSLIC, calling it the Savings
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FDIC is the principal federal regulator of state-chartered
banks" that, are Inot members of the Federal Reserve Sys2°
tem.
When a bank becomes insolvent, 2' the relevant chartering

Association Insurance Fund (SAIFM).

12 U.S.C. § 1821(aX6) (Supp. H 1990). It

renamed the PIF, calling it the Bank Insurance Fund ("BIF"). 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(aX5) (Supp. 11 1990). The FDIC currently administers the BIF and the
SAIF. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(aX4XA) (Supp. H 1990). FIRREA also created the
Resolution Funding Corporation ('REFCORP"), 12 U.S.C § 1441(b) (Supp. II
1990), to raise capital, 12 U.S.C. § 1441b(a) (Supp. H 1990), through contributions from the Federal Home Loan Banks and Department of Treasury
Borrowings, see House Comm. on Ways and Means, H. R. Rep. No. 54, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1989). REFCORP, in turn funds the Resolution Trust
Corporation ("RTC"). 12 U.S.C. § 1441b(a). The FDIC acts as exclusive manager
of RTC in connection with the RTC's resolution of thrifts in receivership or
12 U.S.C.
conservatorship between January 1, 1989 and August 9, 1992.
§ 1441a(bXlXc) (Supp. 1 1990).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(aX1XA) (Supp. II 1990) ("The [FDIC] shall insure
the deposits of all insured depository institutions as provided in this chapter").
See also, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (IXA) (Supp. 11 1990) (granting FDIC power to
assess insurance premiums against insured depository institutions); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1817(mX5) (Supp. II 1990) (granting FDIC power to make pro rate distribution to insured depositors upon termination of depository's status as 'insured
depository institution"); 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (1989) (power to evaluate voluntary
mergers, consolidations, conversions, and assumptions among insured institutions for impact on the insurance funds).
1 The term "bank' is used herein to refer to all insured depository institutions regulated by the FDIC. Under FIRREA, "insured depository institution
means 'any bank or savings association the deposits of which are insured by
the Corporation....." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(cX2) (Supp. H 1990).
o The FDIC has authority, among other things to: issue rules concerning
the activities of insured depository institutions, 12 U.S.C. § 1819(aXTenth)
(Supp. 11 1990); examine insured institutions and affiliates, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1782(a), 1817(a) (Supp. H 1990); 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.170(aX2), 571.2 (Supp. II
1990); terminate the insured status of any insured bank, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)
(Supp. I1 1990); initiate cease and desist proceedings, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)
(Supp. II 1990); and initiate proceedings to suspend or remove officers or
directors, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(eXl) (Supp. H 1990).
21 Edward Brainsilver, former General Counsel to the FDIC, has noted that
a bank may be insolvent either when its liabilities exceed its assets, or where
the bank cannot meet the demands of its creditors. Edward Brainsilver, Failing
Banks: FDIC's Options and Constraints, 27 ADMiN. L. REV. 327, 328 (1975). The
Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC are authorized to close a national
bank upon the bank's insolvency. 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 1821(c). A national bank
becomes insolvent when it is unable to meet its obligations as they become due.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(cX5XA) (Supp. II 1990). Smith v. Witherow, 102 F.2d 638,
640 (3d Cir. 1939). When a state-chartered bank becomes insolvent is a matter
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authority typically closes it2 and appoints the FDIC as receiver.2 In the context of a bank resolution, the FDIC acts in two
distinct capacities: as the insurer ("FDIC-Corporate")', and as
the receiver of the failed bank.2 The FDIC typically knows of
the precarious condition of a failing bahk long before the bank
closes.' As soon as bank failure becomes a real possibility, the

of law. See, e.g., K.S.A § 9-1902 (defining conditions under which bank or trust
company becomes insolvent under Kansas law).
Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(b). The FDIC has no authority to close a bank
under its jurisdiction. Only a bank's chartering authority may do so. For
national banks, the relevant authority is the Comptroller of the Currency, see
12 U.S.C. § 191; for state chartered banks, it is the state, chartering authority.
Michael B. Burgee, Purchase and Assumption Transactions Under the Federal
DepositInsurance Act, 14 FORUM .1146, 1149-50 (1979).
' See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (Supp. II 1990). The FDIC must be appointed as
receiver for a failed insured federally-chartered bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(cX2)(AXii) (Supp. 11 1990). A state regulatory authority may appoint the FDIC as
receiver of a failed insured state-chartered" institution, and usually does so. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(cX3XA) (Supp. II 1990). In each case, the FDIC, as receiver, may
exercise all powers conferred on it by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (Supp. II 1990), state
law, or by any other provision of federal law. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(cX2XB) (Supp. II
1990). In certain circumstances, the FDIC may appoint itself as receiver of an
insured state-chaitered institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(cX4) (Supp. II 1990). The
RTC acts as receiver of all savings associations for which a conservator or
receiver' was or will be appointed from January 1, 1989 through October 1,
1993. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(bX3XA) (Supp. II 1990).
24 See

supra note 18.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (Supp. II 1990). -See also, e.g., FDIC v. Lauterbach, 626 F.2d 1327 (7th .Cir. 1980); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); FDIC v. Design & Development, Inc.,
73 F.R.D. 442 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The RTC generally has authority to exercise the
powers the FDIC has in the latter's corporate and receivership capacities. 12
U.S.C. § 1441a(bX4) (Supp. H 1990).
' "As the principal federal regulator of state nonmember banks, FDIC is
likely to be as conscious of the failing bank's problems as the state banking
authority." Burgee, supra note 22, at 1151; See IRVINE H. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT:
AN INsI)ER's ACCOUNT OF BANK FAILURES AND RESCUES 29-30 (1986) (The
FDIC maintains and updates weekly a "probable fail" list of banks that have a
high probability of failure over the next 90 days). The FDIC's pre-failure
involvement can be a matter of a few days to several months. Brainsilver,
supra note 21, at 327. Brainsilver observed: "On an informal basis, the FDIC is
usually informed on the general condition of the sick institution well before [a
declaration of insolvency], and in the case of insured non-member banks, we are
(wearing our regulatory hat) of course as'intimately involved in the problem
from the start as is the state supervisor." Id. at 329 n.6.
Prior to its involvement as a liquidator, the FDIC will ordinarily have had
access to reports prepared by bank examiners which "reflect asset values adjust-
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FDIC typically will begin to consider its options in connection
with the discharge of its dual roles. The FDIC-Corporate can
discharge its obligations as deposit insurer by paying depositors'
insured claims in cash or "by making available to each depositor a transferred deposit in another insured bank in an amount
equal to the insured deposit."' As receiver, the FDIC may liquidate the failed bank, merge it with another insured bank,
transfer any or all of its assets to another bank, create a new
bank, or structure a transaction that combines one or more of
the foregoing.2
The FDIC's governing statute limits the agency's discretion
to select among resolution methods. The statute requires the
FDIC to adopt a resolution which minimizes the cost to the
deposit insurance fund and maximizes the return to creditors of
the failed bank.2 To achieve its goal, the FDIC-Corporate may
use deposit insurance fund money in ways other than direct
payment of insured claims.3 ° The FDIC-Corporate may expend
no more than the amount that it would have expended if it
liquidated the bank and paid all insured depositors in full."1

ed for estimated losses in all assets, particularly loans...." Id. at 328.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(f) (Supp. H 1990).
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (Supp. II 1990). The FDIC can also provide 'open
bank assistance' by making loans, purchasing assets or making deposits in a
failing bank before it closes. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c) (Supp. II 1990). The FDIC can
only provide this type of assistance if either: (1) the assistance is undertaken to

prevent the default of the institution; or (2) the assistance is taken in order to
lessen the risk to the FDIC posed by an institution's operation under severe
financial conditions. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(cXl) (Supp. H 1990). See FDIC Statement
of Policy on Assistance to OperatingInsured Banks and Savings Associations, 55
FED. REG. 12, 559 (1990).
See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(cX4XA) (Supp. H 1990); FDIC v. Addleman, 750 P.
2d 1037 (Kan. 1988).

-o Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1823(cX2XA) (Supp. II 1990), the FDIC can: (1)
make a direct cash payment to a failing bank to permit its continued operation;
(2) await closing of the bank and pay out on insured deposit claims; or (3)
finance the assumption of the failed banes deposit liabilities by way of a
purchase and assumption transaction, discussed infra notes 32-43 and accompa-

nying text. Burgee, supra note 22, at 1151-52.
3' 12 U.S.C. § 1823(cX4XA) (Supp. 1I 1990). For example, if it appeared that

the assets of a financial institution were sufficient to pay its insured deposit
liabilities, then no assistance would be permitted, unless the continued operation of the insured depository is essential to provide adequate depository
services to the community. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(cX4XA) (Supp. II 1990). If the cost
test is satisfied, the FDIC must consider the immediate and long term obliga-
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The FDIC prefers a resolution known as a purchase and
assumption transaction.32 In one common type of purchase and
assumption transaction, the FDIC arranges for a sale of the
failed bank's assets and liabilities to a healthy bank who submits the highest bid (the "assuming bank) 33 The assuming
bank purchases all assets of the failed bank that are of market
quality ("acceptable assets") and assumes all of its deposit liabilities, including uninsured deposits." The assuming bank is
usually willing to pay a premium over book value of the acceptable assets reflecting the bank's going concern value (the "pre-

mium")." In the typical case, the value of the failed bank's

tions of the FDIC-Corporate, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(cX4XAXi) (Supp. II 1990), and
any reasonably ascertainable federal tax consequences with respect to any
assistance provided. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(cX4XAXii) (Supp. II 1990). The FDIC's
discretion is not limited at all "in any case in which the Corporation determines
that the continued operation of such insured depository institution is essential
to provide adequate depository services in the community." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4XA) (Supp. 11 1990). See Sprague, supra note 26, at 24-29.
2 See Sprague, supra note 26, at 24-26. The Eleventh Circuit described a
typical purchase and assumption transaction in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d
862, 865-66 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982). See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1821(iX3), 1823(c) (Supp. II 1990).
' The FDIC may structure a purchase and assumption transaction in a
variety of ways. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(cX2XA) (Supp. II 1990). Each permutation
accomplishes basically the same thing, a healthy bank purchases some of the
failed bank's assets and assumes its deposit liabilities. For example, the FDIC
may enter into a "total asset purchase and assumption transaction" in which
the healthy bank purchases virtually all of the failed bank's assets (including
unacceptable assets), and receives from the FDIC an amount equal to the
difference between the book value of the assets purchased and their estimated
actual value. Another alternative resolution is known as a "selected loan asset
purchase and assumption transaction." In this type of transaction, the healthy
bank purchases all of the failed bank's loan portfolio below a certain dollar
amount (usually $5,000 to $20,000). Barry Stuart Zisman & William B. Waites,
Banks and Thrifts: Government Enforcement and Receivership (1991), reprinted
in, Practicing Law Institute, Banks and Thrifts Introduction to FDICIRTC
Receivership Law 57-58 (1992).
' Such acceptable assets normally include only cash, marketable securities
and the real property on which the *bank and its branches are located. In
certain cases, the assuming bank will purchase an option to purchase the failed
bank's loan portfolio net of any troubled or defaulted loans. See Burgee, supra
note 22, at 1154. The assuming bank normally assumes all of the deposit
liabilities of the failed bank, not just insured deposits. E.g., Grubb v. FDIC, 868
F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1989)..
' Going concern value is comprised largely of the customer base acquired
by the assuming bank in the form of assumed deposit liabilities. Burgee, supra
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acceptable assets plus the premium is less than its deposit
liabilities.' To induce the assuming bank to undertake the

transaction, the FDIC as receiver must pay the assuming bank
an amount equal to the difference between the deposit liabilities on the one hand, and the acceptable assets plus the premi-

um on the other (the "FDIC payment). 37 Thus a purchase and

assumption transaction gives depositors of the failed bank uninterrupted access to deposited funds, avoiding returned checks,

lost time value of money, and loss of confidence associated with
the alternative of closing the failed bank and paying the claims
of insured depositors.38 It also involves a lower immediate

cash outlay by the FDIC-Corporate than that required to pay
insured claims in full. 9
The FDIC as receiver obtains cash for the FDIC payment
from the FDIC-Corporate by either selling or pledging the unacceptable assets of the failed bank to FDIC-Corporate. 40 The
note 22, at 1155.

:Id.
'v Id.
Assume total deposit liabilities (D) equal $100,000, acceptable assets
(A) equal $20,000, and the premium bid by the assuming bank (P) is $5000.
The FDIC payment will be D - (A + P), or $75,000.
' The FDIC allows a bank to close and pays the claims of insured depositors only as a "last resort.L " Burgee, supra note 22, at 1152. Burgee observed
that bank failure and subsequent payoff of insured deposits:
results in an interruption of vital banking services to the community
which the failed bank served. The failed bank's main office and any branches which it operated are permanently closed. As a consequence, virtually all of the failed bank's employees are without jobs. All time, demand
and saving deposit accounts of the failed bank are frozen and any checks
in transit at the time the bank closed are returned unpaid to the drawer.
...
[Amny going concern value that the failed bank may have had as a
viable banking enterprise is lost irrevocably with the permanent closing
of its business.
Id. at 1153.
" See supra note 31. Limitations on available cash have had an impact on
the method by which regulators have resolved failed thrifts. The need for a
massive bailout of the savings and loan industry through FIRREA has been
attributed to underfunding of the FSLIC's insurance fund: ."[B]ecause the thrift
insurance fund (the FSLIC) had insufficient reserves to close or reorganize
insolvent thrifts, policymakers permitted institutions with massive incentives to
gamble with federally insured funds to run up losses in excess of $150 billion
(excluding interest payments on funds borrowed to clean up the mess)." Subcomm. Report, supra note 12, at 5-6. The Subcommittee concluded that the
FDIC faced the same crisis as the FSLIC faced - insufficient cash to pay for
its expected caseload of bank failures. Id. at 6-10, 19.
40 12 U.S.C. § 1823(dX1) (Supp. II 1990). The FDIC-Corporate has the
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owner of the unacceptable assets (FDIC-Corporate or receiver as
the case may be) then undertakes to liquidate them.41 The
FDIC applies the proceeds of such liquidation first to reimburse
itself for the FDIC payment.' The FDIC then distributes any
remaining proceeds through the receivership to the failed institution's non-depositor creditors.'
Notwithstanding the particulars of the transaction the FDIC
may arrange to resolve a bank failure, the FDIC typically finds
itself responsible for the liquidation of at least some of the
failed bank's unacceptable assets. The FDIC acquires the assets
in bulk, under distress conditions, and knowing that the assets
are non-performing or otherwise objectionable to a healthy
bank. This is the context in which the rule of immunity comes
into play. Borrowers, not surprisingly, raise defenses to the
FDIC's collection efforts." The federal rule of immunity determines which claims and defenses are valid against the FDIC
and which are not.
I.
A.

THE FDIC's IMMUNITY

The D'Oench Doctrine

The tension between the rights of a bank receiver and
obligors on obligations comprising a failed bank's portfolio is
almost as old as the regulation of banking in the United States.
From the dawn of regulation, financially troubled banks scrambled to disguise inadequate capitalization and uncollectible loan
portfolios from the scrutiny of the bank examiner. In a typical

authority to purchase any assets from the FDIC as receiver in connection with
a purchase and assumption transaction, including assets which are non-transferrable under state law. FDIC v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466, 1471 (10th Cir.
1990).
41 12 U.S.C. §1823(dX3) (Supp. II 1990).

12 U.S.C. §§ 1823(dX2), 1821(dX2Xe) (Supp. II 1990). The FDIC becomes
subrogated to the claims of depositors assumed by the assuming bank and is
entitled to reimburse the insurance fund from the proceeds of liquidation with
an amount equal to the FDIC payment. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(g), 1821(dXll)(AXi) (Supp. II 1990).
4 12 U.S.C. § 1821(dX11XAXfi) (Supp. II 1990). The last to be paid are the
failed bank's shareholders. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(dX11XB) (Supp. II 1990).
" FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744, 752 (3d Cir.
1985).
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case, a bank in trouble would arrange for a friendly dupe to
execute a promissory note subject to an oral agreement that the
note was "for the accommodation of the bank" and would never
be called. The bank examiner would consider the promissory
note for what it appeared to be - the unconditional obligation
of the party who signed it, and would value the loan as an
asset of the bank accordingly. When the bank failed and a
receiver sued to collect, the dupe would assert as a defense the
oral agreement negating his liability.
Courts considering such "fictitious asset" cases applied classical contract principles and decided them based on the presence
or absence of consideration for the obligation.' A few courts
recognized that application of these principles could reward
dishonest bankers and their cronies. In The German American
State Bank v. Watson,46 the defendant gave his note to the
bank as an accommodation to his friend who had already borrowed the statutory limit from the bank. In dicta, the court
observed that the defendant could not avoid liability by proof
that he and the bank intended that his unconditional obligation
would have no effect other than to deceive the bank examiner.' Alternatively to its holding that the defendant's obligation was supported by consideration, the court held: "To allow
the relations of the parties to be controlled by such an agreement would be to countenance and give effect to a secret arrangement entered into for the purpose of evading the law
which limits the amount which a bank may lend to one per,
son."48
41 See, e.g., Higgins v. Ridgeway, 47 N.E. 32 (N.Y. 1897); Note, Liability on
a Note Given to a Bank as a Fictitious Asset, 38 HARV. L. REV. 239, 239-40
(1925) (criticizing decisions finding sufficient consideration for defendant's note
in his improved position as a stockholder or the bank as "overstep[ping] the
commonly accepted bounds of consideration.")
48 99 Kan. 686 (1917).
47 Id. at 693.
48 Id. at 690. In First National Bank of New Rockford v. Davidson, 188
N.W. 194 (N.D. 1922), the court opined in dicta that the defendants' note, given
to the bank to deceive the bank examiner as to the extent of their overdraft,
was enforceable against them. The court reasoned that defendants knew that
banking was "fraught with public concern" and that "public faith and credit and
honesty in business transactions" are critical assets of a bank. Id. at 199. Even
assuming that the note was supported by legal consideration, 'it was wrong for
the defendants to so sign such note upon any understanding of nonliability .... ." Id. See also Vallely v. Devaney, 194 N.W. 903, 906 (N.D. 1923) ("To
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By the 1930s, state courts had recognized a rule which estopped a defendant from asserting non-liability on an obligation
pursuant to an agreement with the bank designed to fool the
bank examiners. 49 The common law rule was based on the
doctrine of equitable estoppel and operated when a party to an
obligation permitted it to be used in' a way that overstated the
banks assets. The rule thus estopped the obligor from asserting
a defense based on a side agreement with the bank that his
obligation was not what it appeared to be.
The Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhume & Co. v. FDIC,'
incorporated the state law rule into federal common law to
immunize the FDIC from defenses of borrowers. The facts in
D'Oench reveal a familiar attempt by the failed bank to prop
up its financial statement by "cooking" its books. The petitioner
was a securities broker who sold bonds to a bank. After default
on the bonds, the petitioner purchased them by exchanging the
bonds for promissory notes.5 The bank could then show the
bank examiner "live" notes on its books in place of the defaulted bonds, with the effect of concealing the bank's losses on the
bonds. The obligor asserted as a defense to the FDIC's collection action that its note was given without consideration and
that the FDIC was not a holder in due course.
The Court held as a matter of federal common law that the
obligor's defense based on a "secret agreement" was invalid
against the FDIC.52 To allow such a defense would derogate

sanction any arrangement, therefore, whereby the real assets and securities of a
bank are to be regarded as less than or different from the apparent assets and
securities, would tend to defeat the entire purpose of the regulatory measures.")
"' See, e.g., Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 5 N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1936);
Cedar State Bank v. Olson, 122 N.E. 160 (Kan. 1924); Vallely v. Devaney, 194
N.W. 903 (N.D. 1923).
315 U.S. 447 (1942).
51Id. at 454.
52 A few years before D'Oench, in Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940),
the Court held that as a matter of federal law, a borrower was estopped from
asserting against a receiver of a failed bank a defense based on an oral understanding that the bank would never call his note. The borrower and the bank
had used the note to conceal from the bank examiner the bank's criminal
purchase of its own stock. The Court held that the purpose of the criminal
sanctions under the National Bank Act would be defeated "if a director or
officer or any other by his connivance could place in the bank's portfolio his
obligation good on its face, as a substitute for its stock illegally acquired." Id. at
195. In Deitrick, the obligor's action was itself a violation of the National Bank
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from the federal policies underlying the FDIC Act which "protect [the FDIC] ... from misrepresentations made to induce or
influence the action of [the FDIC] ." Justice Jackson, in a
concurring opinion, observed: "The [FDIC] did not simply step
into the private shoes of local banks. The purposes sought to be
accomplished by it can be accomplished only if it may rely on
the integrity of banking statements and banking assets."" The
FDIC thus became immune from any defense raised by an
obligor whenever an obligation "was designed to deceive the
creditors or the public authority or would tend to have that
effect."5
The Court held that proof of the obligor's intention to deceive
the bank examiners was not required. Even though the obligor
did not know the bank would use his note to deceive the FDIC,
he presumptively knew that the note concealed the true value
of the bank's assets from the bank examiners.' The obligor
need only have been aware of the appearance made by his note
in the records of the bank.57 The Court noted, "It would be
sufficient in this type of case that the [obligor] lent himself to a
scheme or arrangement whereby the banking authority on
which [the FDIC] relied in insuring the bank was or was likely
to be misled."'

Act. 309 U.S. at 198. In D'Oench, however, the obligor'had committed no
statutory offense. Even though the FDIC Act imposed criminal sanctions on
persons who lied to influence the FDIC, 315 U.S. at 461, the obligor had
executed the promissory notes before the FDIC came into existence. Id. at 464
(Frankfurter, J. concurring).
315 U.S. at 459 (citation omitted).
54 Id. at 472.
' Id. at 460. Whether the bank or the FDIC is actually deceived is irrelevant. Id. at 459, 461. The D'Oench doctrine bars affirmative claims as well as
defenses. E.g., Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Service Bank for Savings," 932
F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1991). The FDIC is entitled to immunity under the D'Oench
doctrine in its corporate and receivership capacities. E.g., FDIC v. McClanahan,
795 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1986). The D'Oench doctrine protects the FSLIC.
E.g., McLemore v. Landry, 898 F.2d 996, 1000 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor.,
River Villa Partnership v. Sun Belt Fed1 Bank F.S.B., _ U.S. _, 111 S.Ct.
428 (1990). Assignees of the federal insurers are entitled to immunity under the
D'Oench doctrine as well. E.g., Porras v. Petroplex Say. Ass'n, 903 F.2d 379 (5th
Cir. 1990); Bell & Murphy and Assocs., Inc. v. Intenfirst Bank Gateway, 894
F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989).
5315 U.S. at 459-60.
11 Id. at 460.
' Id. at 460. The obligor's ignorance of the bank's scheme to conceal its
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Whether an obligor has "lent himself to a scheme or arrangement" sufficient to invoke the D'Oench doctrine against him has
been the subject of litigation. For example, in FDIC v. Meo,e
an obligor executed a note in favor of a bank as payment for
his purchase of voting stock in the bank. Unbeknownst to the
obligor, the bank sold him non-voting stock. After the bank
failed, the FDIC sued to collect the obligation, and the obligor
raised fraud and failure of consideration as defenses. The Ninth
Circuit held for the obligor. The D'Oench doctrine did not bar
the obligor's defense- of failure of consideration because the
obligor "was neither a party to any deceptive scheme involving,
nor negligent with respect to, circumstances giving rise to the
claimed defense to his note .... .'
Only a few litigants have been as successful as Meo in establishing innocence as a defense to the D'Oench doctrine. 61 In
FDIC v. McClanahan,' the obligor signed a promissory note
but left the amount due blank on the oral understanding that if
the bank approved his loan application, the bank would fill in
the appropriate amount. An unscrupulous bank officer told the
obligor that his loan application had been denied. The obligor
failed to retrieve his incomplete note. The officer completed the
note and pocketed the proceeds. The Fifth Circuit concluded
that by signing and delivering a blank promissory note, the

true net worth was no defense to the application of the doctrine. Id. In his

concurring opinion, Justice Jackson observed: "[The obligor's] conduct was
intended to and did have a direct and independent effect on unknown third
parties, among whom [the FDIC] now appears." Id. at 474 (citation omitted).
9 505 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974).
o Id. at 793. The court distinguished the facts from those in D'Oench:
Appellant was a bona fide purchaser-borrower, he did not enter into any
scheme or secret agreement whereby the assets of the bank would be
overstated; he was wholly innocent of the wrongful action of [the bank] in
issuing voting trust certificates instead of common stock shares; he was
not negligent in failing to discover the manner in which the stock order
was actually executed; and, most importantly, appellant had no knowledge whatsoever of the failure of consideration until after the bank was
closed and appellee instituted this suit.
Id. at 792.
6 In re Longhorn Securities Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. Okla. 1983);
FDIC v. Turner, 869 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court ultimately
limited the "innocence" exception to the D'Oench doctrine in Langley v. FDIC,
484 U.S. 86 (1987). See infra, notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
e2 795 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1986).
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obligor "lent himself' to a scheme sufficiently to invoke the
D'Oeiich doctrine against him.s The court left open the possibility that an obligor's innocence may preclude estoppel under
the D'Oench doctrine: "It may be possible to imagine circumstances in which - whether because of prevailing business
practices or the maker's extreme lack of sophistication - the
signing of a blank note could be so wholly innocent as to preclude the FDIC from requiring on that basis alone that the
maker be estopped from defending himself on grounds of failure
of consideration and fraud in the inducement."'
B.

12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)

In 1950, Congress enacted statutory immunity for the FDIC
in 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).65 Under § 1823(e), an obligor may assert a claim or defense against the FDIC only if she has expressly conditioned her obligation to pay on the events giving
rise to the claim or defense. Courts have generally taken the
view that § 1823(e) codifies the D'Oench doctrine.' Nonethedoctrine has survived as an independent basis
less, the D'Oench
67
of immunity.
Both the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) focus on the nature
of the obligation and whether it appeared unconditional, thus
"tending to deceive", bank examiners. Unlike the D'Oench doc-

at 517.
Id. at 516, (citing Meo, 505 F.2d at 792). But see, FSLIC v. Gordy, 928
F.2d 1558, 1566 (11th Cir. 1991) (D'Oench doctrine applies even in the absence
of bad faith, recklessness or negligence of the obligor).
' See supra, note 9. FIRREA subsequently amended § 1823(e) to provide
explicitly for its application to the FDIC in its capacity as receiver, and made
some grammatical changes. Pub. L. 101-73 § 217(4). FDIC v. State Bank of
Virden, 893 F.2d 139, 143 (7th Cir. 1990).
' See, e.g., Twin Constr., Inc. v. Boca Raton, Inc., 925 F.2d 378, 382 (11th
Cir. 1991); Firstsouth F.A. v. Aqua Constr., Inc., 858 F.2d 441, 442, n.2 (8th
Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 744, 753 (3d Cir.
63Id.
4

1985); Hartigan v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of America, 723 F. Supp.
1258, 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[IThe D'Oench doctrine sweeps more broadly than
[slection 1823(e)."); Miller & Meacham, supra note 8, at 627-28 (arguing that
Congress intended to restrict the FDIC's powers pursuant to § 1823(e) rather
than expand them).
' Note, Borrower Beware: D'Oench, Duhume and Section 1823 Overprotect
the Insurer When Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 253, 271-73 (1988) (the
relationship between the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) is unclear).
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trine, however, § 1823(e) expressly defines when an "agreement" has the tendency to deceive bank examiners - when it
fails to satisfy each of the section's four recordation requirements. An agreement, to be effective against the FDIC, must be
written, executed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the
obligation by the bank, approved by the bank's board of directors or its loan committee as noted in the bank's minutes, and,
continuously an official record of the bank.' Under § 1823(e),
the FDIC is immune unless the statute's four recordation requirements are satisfied even if the FDIC had actual knowledge
of an. unrecorded claim or defense.9 The FDIC thus acquires.
obligations free from any claim or defense based on an agreement that purports to negate or impose conditions on the obligor's obligation to pay and which is not a part of the bank's
records.
Section 1823(e) also appears to render the culpability of the
obligor irrelevant. Nonetheless, culpability remained an issue in

' The Supreme Court in Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987), recognized
two related policy goals underlying § 1823(e). First, by barring all claims or
defenses based on agreements which are not part of a bank's official records,
the statute protects the reliability of bank records, and ostensibly enables bank
examiners to rely on them in evaluating the worth of a bank's assets and the
extent of its liabilities. Id. at 91-92. Second, by requiring contemporaneous and
continuous recordation of all aspects of an agreement, § 1823(e) ostensibly
"ensures mature consideration of unusual loan transactions by senior bank
officials and prevents fraudulent insertion of new terms with the collusion of
bank employees when a bank appears headed for failure." Id. at 92. The
contemporaneity requirement has resulted in uncertainty as to whether a postclosing loan modification or workout is enforceable against the FDIC. See FDIC
v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1234, 1239 (5th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Manatt, 922
F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, _
U.S. _ 111 S.Ct. 2889 (1991) (dicta);
RTC v. Crow, 763 F. Supp. 887, 892-95 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Elizabeth C. Yen,
Loan Modification and Workout Agreements: Are They Inherently Unenforceable
Against FederalBanking Regulators? 109 BANKING L.J. 177 (1992).
' The Supreme Court held that the FDIC's actual knowledge of an unrecorded claim or defense was irrelevant. Langley v. FDIC 484 U.S. 86, 94-95
(1987); FDIC v. Rosenthal, 477 F. Supp. 1223, 1227 (E.D. Wis. 1979), affd, 631
F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1980) (FDIC's notice of substantial discount off face value of
note at time of acquisition would not affect its immune status under § 1823(e)).
The Court's holding in Langley has been extended to the D'Oench doctrine.
FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Although Langley was
decided under section 1823(e), we find no reason why we should reach a
different result in this respect under D'Oench Duhume than we would reach
under section 1823(e)."); Sunbelt Savings FSB v. Amrecorp Realty, 730 F. Supp.
741, 746 n.15 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
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litigation by way of a narrow interpretation of the term "agreement." Section 1823(e) only invalidates claims or defenses based
on an "agreement."70 Instead of asserting their innocence,
obligors could escape § 1823(e) by characterizing their claim or
defense as one in equity, tort, or any way other than based on
an agreement.7 ' Regardless of whether the FDIC asserted the
D'Oench doctrine or § 1823(e) or both, the obligor could overcome the FDIC's immunity by arguing that he was a blameless
victim of the failed bank's wrongdoing. For example, an obligor
might assert that the failed bank made misrepresentations that
induced her to enter into a loan. The obligor would argue that
her defense of fraud in the inducement was not based on an
agreement. Because the defense was not based on an agreement, but rather the bank's fraud, § 1823(e) would not protect
the FDIC. Moreover, because the obligor did not "lend herself
to a scheme, the D'Oench doctrine would also be unavailable to
the FDIC.72
In Langley v. FDIC,7" the Supreme Court held that the
term "agreement" in § 1823(e) includes any coriditions on the
obligor's obligation to pay, including the truthfulness of representations made to induce the obligor to undertake the obligation. The decision eliminated the relevance of the culpability of
the obligor and undercut the viability of fraud defenses against
the FDIC.74 The FDIC acquired Langley's promissory note as

7' See infra note 75.
71 For example, in Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982), obligors on a $3 million note held by the FDIC
pursuant to a purchase and assumption transaction attempted to rescind it on
the grounds of the failed banlks fraud. The Eleventh Circuit held that § 1823(e)
did not bar the obligors' defense because the defense was not based on an
agreement. The court characterized their defense as based on the premise that
because of the fraud of the bank, no agreement existed at all. Id. at 867. The
court ultimately held the FDIC was immune from the defense based on federal

common law. See infra, notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
72 See, e.g., Astrup v. Midwest Fed. Say. Bank, 886 F.2d 1057, 1059 (8th
Cir. 1989) (D'Oench doctrine provides no immunity against tort claims); but see
Timberland Design, Inc. v. First Service Bank for Savings, 932 F.2d 46, 50 (1st
Cir. 1991) (rejecting Astrup).
73 484 U.S. 86 (1987).
74 See FDIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1991); Timberland

Design, Inc. v. First Service Bank for Savings, 932 F.2d 46, 50 (lst Cir. 1991);
Hartigan v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of America, 723 F. Supp. 1258,
1262 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("pre-Langley decisions... call for a greater degree of
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part of a purchase and assumption transaction and brought suit
to collect. Langley defended on grounds that the failed bank
had procured his note by fraudulent misrepresentations regard-

ing the land Langley was to obtain in exchange for it. The
FDIC claimed immunity under § 1823(e). Langley argued that
his fraudulent inducement defense was not based on an agreement and was not barred by § 1823(e).

The Court rejected Langley's contention that the term "agreement" encompassed only promises to perform an act in the
future. 75 It noted that § 1823(e) allows federal and state bank
examiners to rely on a bank's records in evaluating the worth
of the bank's assets.7 6 The specific recordation requirements in
§ 1823(e) "ensure mature consideration of unusual loan transactions by senior bank officials, and prevent fraudulent insertion
of new terms, with the collusion of bank employees, when a
bank appears headed for failure."77 To further these purposes,
the term "agreement" must encompass every understanding
between the parties regarding the obligation, including both
promises and conditions to liability.78 Section 1823(e) barred
Langley's defense of fraudulent inducement because it was

borrower involvement than the Supreme Court has now made clear is requir-

ed").

71 Prior to Langley, many courts interpreted the term "agreement" to
encompass only promises. E.g., FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262 (6th Cir. 1985)

(failure of consideration defense not based on agreement); Gunter v. Hutcheson,
674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982) (fraud in the inducement defense not based on agreement); FDIC v. Ohlson, 659 F. Supp. 490, 491
(N.D. Iowa 1987) (mental incapacity defense not based on agreement).
"' "Such evaluations are necessary when a bank is examined for fiscal
soundness by state or federal authorities . . . and when the FDIC is deciding
whether to liquidate a failed bank... or to provide financing for purchase of
its assets . .. by another bank ...
The last kind of evaluation, in particular,
must be made 'with great speed, usually overnight, in order to preserve the
going concern value of the failed bank and avoid an interruption in banking
services.- 484 U.S. at 91 (quoting Gunter v. Hutcheson, 674 F.2d 862, 865 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982)). In reality, the FDIC does not evaluate
a failed bank's assets overnight. It typically has a fairly accurate picture of the
fair market value of a bank's loan portfolio well before it determines to enter
into a purchase and assumption transaction. The consummation of a purchase
and assumption transaction itself may occur overnight. See supra notes 26-28
and accompanying text.
7 Langley, 484 U.S. at 92.
78 Id. at 87.
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really based on a defense of failure of an unrecorded condition
precedent - the truthfulness of the oral representations.7 9
The Court interpreted the meaning of the term "agreement"
by reference to the black letter law of contracts.' But it clarified another question regarding the scope of § 1823(e) by analogy to state law governing negotiable instruments. Langley argued that because of the failed bank's fraud, the FDIC had no
"interest" in his obligation which the agreement in question
could "tend to diminish." Therefore, the FDIC did not acquire
an "asset" to which its statutory immunity attached. The Court
resolved the issue by citing to U.C.C. § 3-305, which excepts
from a holder in due course's immunity those defenses which
would render an obligation void as opposed to merely voidable."' Langley's fraud in the inducement defense could render
his obligation merely voidable, and so the FDIC's voidable title
to it was protected under § 1823(e). 2
To illustrate, suppose the FDIC acquires an instrument that
purports to be the unconditional promissory note of A as part of
a purchase and assumption transaction. In defense, A claims
that she only signed the note because a bank officer held a gun
to her head. Using the rubric of the holder in due course rule,
A raises a "real" defense, that of duress, which would be valid
against a holder in due course." Consequently, the obligor
may raise this defense notwithstanding § 1823(e). If, however,
the obligor's defense was "personal" (rendering the obligation
voidable as opposed to void), it would be subject to the recordation requirements of § 1823(e).'
79

Id. at 91. The Court held: "Quite obviously, the parties' bargain cannot

be reflected without including the conditions upon their performance, one of the

two principal elements of which contracts are constructed." Cf. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRAcTs § 8.2, at 537 (1982) ("[Plromises, which impose duties, and conditions, which make duties conditional, are the main components of agreements").
Id.
0 Id. at 90-91.

"1 Id. at 93 (citing U.C.C. § 3-305(2Xc) (1978)). See U.C.C. § 3-305(aX1)

(1990).
484 U.S. at 93-94.
s' U.C.C. § 3-305(aXlXii) (1990).
8 See Langley, 484 U.S. at 93; FDIC v. Bracero & Rivera, Inc., 895 F.2d
824 (1st Cir. 1990), but see McLemore v. Landry, 898 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom, River Villa Partnership v. Sun Belt Fed'l Bank, - U.S.
111 S.Ct. 428 (1990) (fraud in factun defense invalid under § 1823(e)
notwithstanding Langley).
'2Langley,
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Although it cited the holder in due course rule to support
part of its opinion, the Court did not address whether the rule
of immunity embodied in § 1823(e) applies only when the obligation at issue is negotiable.8 The Court described Langley's
obligation as a "facially unqualified note,"" and an "instrument."8 7 But it did not expressly find that Langley's obligation
was negotiable, nor did it expressly limit its holding to negotiable instruments or even unconditional obligations to pay." The
ordinary meaning of "asset," as it appears in § 1823(e), includes
not only property rights in the form of unconditional obligations
but also property rights under bilateral contracts. After
Langley, the issue remains whether and to what extent a rule
of immunity applies to the FDIC where the obligation in issue
is part of a bilateral agreement.89
C.

The Federal Holder in Due Course Rule

The federal holder in due course rule by which the FDIC
acquires the immunity of a state law holder in due course appeared prior to Langley probably as a means of closing the
escape hatch from the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) for unwitting victims of bank misconduct. The first whisper of the
rule appeared in a 1978 district court opinion. In FDIC v. Rockelman," the obligor alleged fraud in the inducement against
the FDIC, in particular that the failed bank tricked him into
exchanging his promissory note for shares of the failed bank's
holding company. The bank officer allegedly induced Rockelman
to execute the note by representing that dividends on the
shares would pay the interest on it and that the shares would

m'Some circuit courts have not limited applicability of § 1823(e) to negotiable instruments. See FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 947 F.2d 196, 206
n.9 (6th Cir. 1992) (dicta); FDIC v. Galloway, 856 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1988);
FDIC v. P.L.M. Intl, Inc., 834 F.2d 248, 254 (lst Cir. 1987); FDIC v. Gulf Life
Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
Langley, 484 U.S. at 93.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 86. In Gunter, in which the Eleventh Circuit applied the federal
holder in due course rule, the obligation was a "note" containing no "transfer
restrictions." Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872.
89 See infra notes 124-134 and accompanying text.
90 460 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
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appreciate sufficiently to repay the principal.9" Although the
court quoted § 1823(e), it did not discuss whether the obligor's
defense was based on an agreement, and if so, whether the
agreement satisfied the recordation requirements. 2 Instead,
the court asserted without citation to authority that Congress
intended § 1823(e) to "clothe [the FDIC] with the protections
afforded a holder in due course and shield [the FDIC] against
any defenses that would otherwise be available."", Such immunity would "promote soundness in banking and . . . aid and
protect the FDIC in the conduct of its duties.'
Nine years after Rockelman but five years before Langley,
the Eleventh Circuit adopted the holder in due course concept
to protect the FDIC from an obligor's defense of fraud in the
5
Gunter alleged fraud in
inducement. In Gunter v. Hutcheson,"
the inducement as a defense to the FDIC's suit against him on
his promissory note. The court held that § 1823(e) did not bar
Gunter's defense because it was not based on an agreement.
Rather, no agreement existed at all because of the failed bank's
fraud.' Nonetheless, the court held that federal common law
immunized the FDIC from Gunter's defense. The court observed
that any other result would undercut the FDIC's immunity
under § 1823(e). If fraud in the inducement was a valid defense
under § 1823(e), an obligor would merely plead as fraud what
was in substance but not form the bank's failure to perform an
unrecorded agreement.9 7

'z

Id. at 1000.

The Court in Langley did not expressly adopt the Rockelman coures
expansive interpretation of § 1823(e). Langley interpreted the term "agreement"

in § 1823(e) to include any promise or condition which limits the obligor's
liability. It did not hold that § 1823(e) gave the FDIC the rights of a holder in
due course. Langley, 484 U.S. at 86.
' Rockelman, 460 F.Supp. at 1003. The court's assertion regarding Congressional intent appears inconsistent with the scant history on the original enactment of § 1823(e). See, Miller & Meacham, supra note 8, at 626-28.
" 460 F. Supp. at 1003. The court acknowledged that some defenses would
remain valid against the FDIC but expressly declined to identify them. Id. at
1003.
93 674 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
96 Id. at 867.

" Id. at 871-72. The court did not consider whether Gunter's defense
constituted fraud in fact, a "real" defense which would be valid against a holder
in due course. It held:
Mhe FDIC has a complete defense to state and common law fraud
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The court in Gunter applied the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,9" to justify both the creation of federal common law and the adoption of
a federal rule that differed from the applicable state law
rule. 9 Citing D'Oench, the court held that federal law controls

the rights and obligations of the FDIC.1" It further held that,
given the special circumstances facing the FDIC, the substance
of the federal law should not follow state law. Rather, the fed-

eral rule should comprehensively immunize the FDIC from
those claims and defenses that would be invalid against a holder in due course.
According to the court, the first two factors in the Kimbell
Foods test - the need for national uniformity and the impact
of state law on the furtherance of federal goals - dictated a
uniform federal rule of immunity for the FDIC. The court rea-

soned that the FDIC needed immunity to fulfill its statutory
function. First, purchase and assumption transactions preserved

"stability of and confidence in the banking system" and thus
were preferable to liquidation as a method of bank failure reso-

claims on a note acquired by the FDIC in the execution of a purchase
and assumption transaction, for value, in good faith, and without actual
knowledge of the fraud at the time the FDIC entered into the purchase
and assumption transaction.
Id. at 873.
98 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
9Gunter, 674 F.2d at 869-72. In Kimbell Foods, the Court adopted a two
part test for determining whether state or federal law governed the priority of
the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Farmers Home Administration (FHA) as creditors. The first part of the test involved a determination of
whether state or federal law should govern the question. Federal law provided
the rule of decision because the SBA and the FHA "derived their authority to
effectuate loan transactions from specific Acts of Congress passed in the exercise of a 'constitutional function or power."' 440 U.S. at 726-27. The second part
of the test involved determining the content of the federal law, particularly
whether state law should provide the federal rule of decision. This depended on
consideration of three factors: (1) whether the federal program required nationwide uniformity; (2) whether adopting state law would frustrate national policy;
and (3) whether a federal rule would disrupt commercial relations based on
state law. Id. at 728. The Court concluded that a uniform national rule was not
necessary and that the state law embodied in the U.C.C. should provide the
rule of decision. Id. at 729.
'0 674 F.2d at 869. The court also cited D'Oench as providing a "general
basis for a federal policy to protect the FDIC." Id. at 872 n.14.
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lution. 0 1 Under federal statute, the FDIC could enter into a
purchase and assumption transaction only where the cost of
such a transaction was less than the cost of a pay-out of insured depositors' claims. Because of the severe time constraints
the FDIC faced when determining how to resolve a bank failure, "the only method of evaluating potential loss open to the
FDIC [is] relying on the books and records of the failed bank to
estimate what assets would be returned by a purchasing bank
and to estimate which of those assets ultimately would be collectible.""° Without a uniform rule of immunity, the FDIC
would be faced with the "impossible" task of determining which
assets would be collectible and which would be subject to an
undisclosed claim or defense.' ° If put to this task, the FDIC
might not choose a purchase and assumption transaction, a
result contrary to the federal goals underlying the creation of
the FDIC.' 4
In weighing the third Kimbell Foods factor - impact on
settled commercial expectations - the court emphasized the
unconditional nature of Gunter's obligation. It observed that

101
Id. at 870.
1 02

Id.

" The court held that a uniform federal rule of immunity was necessky to
protect the FDIC's statutory function given the practical constraints on the
FDIC's decisions in a bank failure.
Unlike the loan programs of the SBA and FHA, which provided ample
opportunity for federal officials to ascertain the impact of state law on
loan decisions, decisions concerning the appropriate method of dealing
with a bank failure must be made with extraordinary speed if the going
concern value of the failed institution is to be preserved. Subjecting the
FDIC to the additional burden of considering the impact of possibly variable state law on the rights involved could significantly impair the FDIC's ability to choose between the liquidation and purchase-and-assumption alternatives in handling a bank failure.
674 F.2d at 869. The factual premise on which the court based its conclusion
does not reflect reality. The FDIC does not evaluate the market value of a
failed bank's assets overnight. See supra note 26.
104 The First Circuit has held that the federal holder in due course rule is
designed expressly to facilitate the FDIC's use of purchase and assumption
transactions. In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust, 968 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir.
1992). Consequently, the FDIC cannot invoke the federal holder in due course
rule unless it has acquired the obligation by way of a purchase and assumption
transaction. Id. Accord, FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1239 n.19 (5th Cir.
1991). The D'Oench doctrine is not subject to this limitation and can apply even
when the FDIC acquired the obligation by operation of law as receiver.
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Gunter's note contained no "transfer restrictions," though the
court did not state whether the obligation was in negotiable
form. 105 The court found that the FDIC was not a holder in
due course of the note simply because the FDIC acquired it
outside the ordinary course of the failed bank's business.'06
The court held that Gunter's obligation could have fallen into
the hands of a holder in due course who would have been immune from his defense. Thus, a rule immunizing the FDIC
could have only an insignificant impact on Gunter's commercial
expectations. Because Gunter should have anticipated the possibility that his obligation could fall into the hands of an immune
party,0 7the first two Kimbell Foods factors outweighed the
1
third.
These decisions articulate a federal holder in due course rule
that creates immunity for the FDIC similar to that enjoyed by
a holder in due course, even though the FDIC does not qualify
for such immunity under state law.'0 8 If the FDIC acquires
an obligation in a purchase and assumption transaction, for
value, in good faith, and without actual knowledge of the defense at the time it entered into the purchase and assumption
agreement, it takes the obligation free of any defense that
would be invalid against a holder in due course. 1' 9 With federal holder in due course immunity, the FDIC trumps the obligor's personal defenses regardless of whether the obligor "lent
himself' to a scheme to defraud, or whether the defense asserted was based on an agreement. Thus the federal holder in due
course rule plugged a hole in both the D'Oench doctrine and

103

674 F.2d at 872.
10 Id.
1"7 Id. The court's conclusion would be correct only if Gunter's obligation
was in negotiable form.
log See, e.g., FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988) (expressly relying on U.C.C. § 3-302 (1978) for the substance of federal holder in duo

course immunity).
1"0 E.g., Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir.
1990); FDIC v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1989); Commerce Federal
Savings Bank v. FDIC, 872 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (6th Cir. 1989); FDIC v. Turner,
869 F.2d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1989); Firstsouth, F.A. v. Aqua Construction, Inc.,
858 F.2d 441, 442-43 (8th Cir. 1988); Sunbelt Savings F.S.B. v. Amrecorp
Realty, 730 F. Supp. 741, 743 (N.D. Tex. 1990). The FDIC takes the obligation
subject to defenses which would be valid against a holder in due course. Turner,
869 F.2d at 273-74.
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pre-Langley § 1823(e) through which an "innocent" obligor could
pass.110 In essence, the federal holder in due course rule immunizes the FDIC from certain claims and defenses against
which it would not be immune under the D'Oench doctrine or
§ 1823(e).111
The requirements for federal holder in due course status are
custom tailored to fit the FDIC. In FDIC v. Wood, u the court
held that, absent actual knowledge about a defense to an obligation acquired in a purchase and assumption transaction, the
FDIC is sufficiently "innocent" to qualify for the immunities of
a holder in due course even when it does not satisfy the requirements of holder in due course status. It held: "If it is true
that the state's bright-line requirements prevent the FDIC from
being a holder in due course, then it is inappropriate to apply
those requirements to a government agency crucial to the existence of the modem banking system when they are without
purpose." 113 The court did not explore what the purpose of the
rejected bright-line requirements might be.

110Under the federal holder in due course rule, whether the obligoer's claim

or defense sounded in tort, equity or statutory violation, or whether the obligor
"lent himself" to a scheme to deceive became irrelevant. For example, in FDIC
v. Wilson, 722 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Tex. 1989), the court held that even if an
obligor could establish his "complete innocence" as an escape from the D'Oench
doctrine, he must still establish that "the basis of his innocence is a defense
available against a holder in due course." 722 F.Supp at 317. The obligor
alleged mental incapacity as a defense to his obligation. Because under Texas
law, the defense of mental incapacity was invalid against a holder in due
course, the FDIC was immune from it under the federal holder in due course
rule. Id. at 317-18.
...
Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872 n.14; In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust,
968 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir. 1992). In FDIC v. Ohlson, 659 F. Supp. 490, 491 (N.D.
Iowa 1987), the court held that § 1823(e) did not bar the defense of mental
incapacity because it was not based on an agreement. Nonetheless, the federal
holder in due course rule immunized the FDIC against it. Id. at 491.
112758 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). The Sixth
Circuit applied the federal holder in due course rule to invalidate an obligor's
usury defense. Under state usury law, the note in question bore an interest rate
which exceeded the lawful limit for a non-business loan. Because the defense
asserted was usury and was not based on an agreement (pre-Langley), neither
the D'Oench doctrine nor § 1823(e) squarely applied to bar it. The court adopted
the Gunter court's formulation of the federal holder in due course rule, and held
that the obligor's usury defense was invalid against the FDIC because it would
be invalid against a holder in due course under state law. Id. at 159-61.
113Id. at 160.
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The federal holder in due course rule protects the FDIC
when it acquires an asset in a purchase -and assumption transaction, even though acquisition of an obligation in an out of the
ordinary course transaction would normally preclude holder in
due course status. 4 Furthermore, the FDIC's acquisition of
the obligation in a purchase and assumption transaction automatically satisfies the requirements that the FDIC acquire the
obligation in good faith and for value. 5
Under the federal holder in due course rule, the FDIC is
immune unless it has "actual knowledge" of the defense. The
obligor in Wood argued that the FDIC did not qualify for immunity because it had constructive knowledge of the defense of
usury.' The obligor asserted that his note bore an interest
rate in excess of the non-business limit, and the failed bank's
files did not contain an affidavit of business purpose, which the
state usury statute required. The court rejected this argument
and held that for purposes of the federal holder in due course
rule the FDIC is immune unless it has actual as opposed to
constructive knowledge of a defense as of the date of the purchase and assumption transaction, and that the FDIC is entitled to a presumption that it has no knowledge of a defense." 7 Thus, unlike under the D'Oench doctrine or
§ 1823(e), for federal holder in due course status, the FDIC is
not charged with knowledge of defenses that review of the
bank's records would have revealed."' In the context of a
11 See infra note 163 and accompanying text. E.g., Sunbelt Savings, FSB v.
Montross, 923 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1991) ("the FDIC receives notes by bulk
transfer involuntarily and as a matter of course, thus, such a technical statelaw requirement cannot be allowed to defeat the policy behind federal holder in
due course doctrine."); Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901 F.2d 1244, 1249
(5th Cir. 1990).
"" Gunter, 674 F.2d at 872-73. The court held that when the FDIC acquires
an obligation as part of a purchase and assumption transaction, it gives "value"
for it. It further held that acquisition of the obligation in a transaction between
FDIC as receiver and FDIC-Corporate, notwithstanding that the parties did not
deal at arms' length, was in good faith. Id. at 873-74. FDIC v. Ashley, 585 F.2d
157 (6th Cir. 1978).
16 758 F.2d at 161-62. As to the distinction between actual and constructive
notice, see Brian A. Blum, Notice to Holders in Due Course and Other Bona
Fide PurchasersUnder the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 B.C. L. REV. 203, 20912 (1981).
117 758 F.2d at 161-62.
116FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d at 156, 162. The FDIC is charged with knowl-
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purchase and assumption transaction, the court reasoned that
the FDIC simply does not have time to examine the assets of
the troubled bank to determine their value. 19 Strangely, this
conclusion contradicts one of the expressed purposes of the
FDIC's immunity - to enable it to rely on the recorded value
of obligations in determining whether to engage in a purchase
and assumption transaction.
The Wood court's holding with respect to the meaning of
"actual knowledge" is confusing in light of the uncertainty as to
whether the federal holder in due course rule applies to nonnegotiable instruments. Under the holder in due course rule, a
transferee is charged with knowledge of certain egregious irregularities that appear on the face of the negotiable instrument; a
transferee is not charged with knowledge of irregularities that
appear in documents other than the instrument itself. In Wood,
the court reached the result that would have obtained under
the state law holder in due course rule governing negotiable
instruments without determining whether the obligation at
issue was negotiable, and without expressly limiting its holding
to negotiable instruments.' Suppose an obligation is expressly conditional in the sense that the obligor's obligation to pay is
expressly subject to performance by the obligee according to
terms of the agreement. If the federal holder in due course rule
applies (notwithstanding that the obligation is not in negotiable
form), the FDIC may acquire- the obligation free of defenses
which appear in the writing but of which the FDIC had no
actual knowledge because it did not actually read the contract.

edge of non-secret or recorded agreements under the D'Oench doctrine and
§ 1823(e) respectively. See FDIC v. McCullough, 911 F.2d 593, 600, en bane
reh'g denied, 920 F.2d 13 (11th Cir. 1990).
119Id. at 162. E.g., In re 604 Columbus Avenue Realty Trust, 968 F.2d 133
(1st Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Merchant's National Bank of Mobile,'725 F.2d 634, 638

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); Gilman v. FDIC, 660 F.2d 688,
694 (6th Cir. 1981).

' U.C.C. § 3-302(aXl) (1990) sets out a number of specific irregularities of
which a transferee is charged with notice whether or not he has subjective

knowledge. If the irregularity is not one of the types described in § 3-302(aXl),
§§ 3-302(aX2) and 1-201(25) apply for determining whether the transferee had
notice of the irregularity. The absence of an affidavit of business purpose would
not have been the type of egregious irregularity of which notice would be
charged to a transferee. Therefore, in Wood, under U.C.C. § 3-302, the FDIC

would not have been charged with notice of the absence of an affidavit.
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Incongruence Among the Sources of Immunity

The D'Oench doctrine, § 1823(e), and the federal holder in
due course rule overlap with unexplained differences at the
margin. It is puzzling why all three sources of immunity continue to exist notwithstanding that each purports to further the
same goal: to enable the FDIC to carry out its statutory duties.
Perhaps three distinct sources of immunity exist because it is
to the FDIC's advantage that they do. If the FDIC is not immune under one source of immunity, it may be immune under
another. The FDIC, by shifting the three sources of immunity
like shells in the infamous con, can stretch its immunity beyond the scope of any one source.
The existence of three sources of immunity creates a number
of problems. For example, each of the three sources limits the
FDIC's immunity depending on the nature of the obligation in
question, in particular, the extent to which the defense asserted
is expressed in the written form of the obligation. The combined
rule arising from the three sources, if it is possible to articulate
one at all, is unsettled regarding the scope of the FDIC's immunity when the asset on which it sues is not an unconditional
obligation to pay.
Under the D'Oench doctrine, the FDIC is immune from an
obligor's defense only if the defense relied on by the obligor was
not "memorialized in writing or otherwise made explicit such
that .

.

. the FDIC would have knowledge of the bank's obliga-

tions during an evaluation of the bank's records."121 Thus, under the D'Oench doctrine, the bank documents embodying the
obligation must "clearly manifest the bilateral nature of the
rights and obligations."' If the defense alleged is not "manifest" from the bank's records, then the obligor "lent himself to a
scheme or
" an arrangement likely to mislead the banking authorities. '

" FDIC v. McCullough, 911 F.2d 593, 600, en banc reh'g denied, 920 F.2d
13 (11th Cir. 1990).
1" Id. at 601 (quoting FSLIC v. Two Rivers Associates, 880 F.2d 1267, 1275
(11th Cir. 1989)).
FDIC v. dordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1567 (11th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Laguarta,
939 F.2d 1231, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1991) (defenses based on bank's breach of
funding obligation as set forth in loan agreement not barred by D'Oench
doctrine even though promissory note was silent as to funding obligations.)
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Whether a particular defense is sufficiently expressed under
§ 1823(e) depends on whether the defense satisfies specific
recordation requirements. If it does not, the obligation is effectively unconditional with respect to that defense in the hands
of the FDIC. Some courts have, however, been unwilling to
enforce the statute literally when the obligation at issue is not
a traditional promissory note but rather a contract with performance obligations on both sides. For example, In Howell v.
Continental Credit Corp.,' the FDIC sought to recover from
The obliHowell the amount due on an equipment lease.'
gor/lessee defended on the grounds that the lessor breached its
obligation to obtain title to the leased equipment. The court
held that although the details of how the lessor was to obtain
title were not contained in the lease, the lease "clearly manifest[ed] the bilateral nature of the lessee's and lessor's rights
and obligations."25 The court held that "the fact that the
court must go outside the leases to test the strength and validity of the defenses is not fatal where the foundation and basis of
that defense is in a document arguably meeting the nonsecrecy
requirements of § 1823(e)."2 7 In FDIC v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Company,28 the Sixth Circuit followed Howell and expanded it. The obligation at issue was Aetna's blanket banker's
bond covering the failed bank. The FDIC tried to cut off Aetna's defenses of misrepresentation and adverse agency.2S Although Aetna's defenses were not expressly preserved in the
bond,13 0 the court held that they were not based on a "secret
or unwritten contractual condition" as was the case under both

124

655 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1981).

12 The original lessor discounted the lease with a bank. The bank failed

and FDIC acquired the lease in a purchase and assumption transaction.

F.2d at 747.
655 F.2d at 748.

1'2 655
127

'2 947 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1991, as amended 1992).
1" The district court held that the bond was an asset and Aetna's defenses

were based on an agreement. It held that Aetna's defenses did not satisfy
§ 1823(e)'s recordation requirements because Aetna did not prove the failed
bank's board knew that the bond application contained fraudulent misrepresentations and expressly endorsed thobe misrepresentations in its minutes. Id. at
201-202.
1"0 The court recognized that Howell was distinguishable for this reason. Id.
at 206.
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D'Oench and Langley.131 The court held: "[A] blanket bond,
unlike a promissory note, involves bilateral obligations. To strip
Aetna of the defense of material misrepresentation ... would
effectively deny Aetna the benefit of its bargain. . . . [We
would be 'giving the FDIC the ability to transmute lead into
gold.' 13 2 The Sixth Circuit in Aetna expressly disagreed with
the Eleventh Circuit's holding in FDIC v. Gulf Life Insurance
Co." ' that § 1823(e) barred 3 unrecorded defenses to coverage
under an insurance contract.1 4
Under the federal holder in due course rule, any condition to
liability appearing in the written form of the obligation defeats
the FDIC's immunity. Thus if any defense appears in the writing, the federal holder in due course rule does not immunize
the FDIC. The Fifth Circuit in Sunbelt Savings, FSB v. Montross, ' held that the federal holder in due course rule only
protects the FDIC when the obligation is in the form of a negotiable instrument satisfying all the technical requirements for
negotiability of Article 3 of the U.C.C. The FDIC sued on a promissory note bearing a variable interest rate which was not
technically negotiable under Texas's codification of the
U.C.C. 13 6 The court held that the federal holder in due course
rule, as well as the D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e) operate to
protect the FDIC from "disadvantage" when "it is forced to
assume control of a troubled financial institution." 137 Extending the federal holder in due course rule to protect the FDIC
from defenses against non-negotiable instruments "would bestow a benefit on the FDIC by changing the assets' nature 3
The Eleventh and Sixth
actually enhancing their value."3'

'3 Id. at 201.
1"

947 F.2d at 207, (quoting Sunbelt Say. FSB Dallas v. Montross, 923 F.2d

363 (5th Cir. 1991)).

737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
4 947 F.2d at 207, 208 n.15.
135923 F.2d 353, 356, affd en bane, 944 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1991).
1.5 Since Montross, the Supreme Court of Texas has held that a variable
interest'rate note meets the sum certain requirement of U.C.C. § 3-104(lXb)(1978). Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992). The
1990 revisions to Article 3 achieve the same result by recognizing that an
instrument bearing a variable rate of interest can be a negotiable instrument.
U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a), 3-112(b) (1990).
'3

'37923 F.2d at 356.

"35
Id. The court observed that makers of non-negotiable notes "sign only a
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Circuits have not so limited the application of the federal holder in due course rule, but rather have applied it regardless of
the non-negotiability of the obligation.l 9
These cases illustrate the current muddle created by the
three sources of immunity. When an obligation is expressed as
an unconditional obligation to pay, for example by way of a
standard promissory note, all three sources of immunity are
relatively easy to apply and all reach the same result. When
the obligation is not in such form, but is part of a bilateral
agreement, the three sources of immunity can yield inconsistent
results.
IV.

EVALUATING THE EFFICIENCY OF AN IMMUNITY RULE

When an obligor considers undertaking an obligation, she
considers the possibility that she will acquire a claim against
the obligee or a defense to her liability caused by the obligee's
failure to perform according to the terms of the contract. By
private agreement and pursuant to ordinary rules of contract
and tort law, the obligor and the obligee allocate between themselves the risk of loss arising from an obligee's potential failure
to perform ("nonperformance loss"). From an efficiency standpoint, the parties' private agreement and rules of law operate
to allocate loss to whichever of them could have avoided it at
lower cost.1" The obligor will also consider the possibility
that she will incur a fairly rare subset of nonperformance loss.
This particular type of loss will occur where the obligor has a
contractual obligation to repay their debt; they had no expectation that holder
in due course doctrine would strip them of their defenses." Id. In its en banc
opinion, the Fifth Circuit held that any personal defenses asserted by the
obligor must be "based on documents of the savings institution at the time of
its insolvency and not upon secret agreements unenforceable under D'Oench."

944 F.2d at 228-29 (citations omitted).
'3"
FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 944
(1985) (FDIC entitled to enforce non-negotiable guaranty under D'Oench doctrine and federal holder in due course rule notwithstanding defenses); FDIC v.
Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1518 (11th Cir. 1984) (federal holder in due
course rule applies to any asset not just negotiable instruments). The Tenth
Circuit appears to follow the Fifth Circuit. See FDIC v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp.
1392, 1402 (D. Kan. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 112 (10th Cir.
1988) (federal holder in due course rule does not apply to non-negotiable
guaranty agreements).
"0 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 95 (4th ed. 1992).
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valid claim or defense but cannot effectively assert it to offset
or reduce her liability on the obligation.
To illustrate, suppose B agrees to loan A $50 a week for the
next year in exchange for A's promise to repay B at the end of
two years. Now suppose that, at the same time she enters into
the contract with A, B sells to C her right to collect payment
from A."" Call the transaction between A and B Contract 1,
and the transaction between B and C Contract 2.
The value of Contract 1 to A is the value of B's performance
the amount of the loan. Most of the risk A assumes under
Contract 1 arises from the possibility that B will not lend the
money as promised.' 42 But B's nonperformance would not result in a loss to A, for A and B allocated the risk of loss from
B's nonperformance to B. In such circumstances, B's nonperformance creates in favor of A a cause of action for breach or a
defense to B's claim for payment in an amount equal to the
value of B's performance. In other words, A is indifferent between B's performance and monetary compensation for her
claim or defense equal to the value to her of B's performance, A
looks primarily to B to compensate her for B's nonperformance.
But A would be just as happy to recover for B's nonperformance from C.
Immunity rules reallocate loss between A and C which A and
B originally allocated to B. A will ultimately bear loss due to
B's nonperformance if two conditions are satisfied: (1) B is
insolvent or otherwise unresponsive to the claim or defense;
and (2) C is immune. The subset of nonperformance loss that A
cannot shift to B or C shall be referred to as "immunity
lOSS."

14

3

.41In this hypothetical, A is the obligor, B is the obligee and C is the
transferee.
142 For example, if B has promised to extend to A a revolving line of credit
on which A can draw provided certain conditions are satisfied, B could fail to
perform by refusing to advance funds to A even though A had satisfied the

conditions.
1
If B is insolvent but has not transferred A's obligation to an immune
party, A will assert her defense against B as a reduction to her liability on the
obligation. If A has an affirmative claim against B she can set it off against her
liability, to the extent that her obligation is sufficiently executory. Loss to A
because of B's insolvency where B has not transferred A's obligation is not
considered immunity loss for purposes of this analysis.
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Although by definition A cannot shift immunity loss to B, A
can insure herself at B's expense against the risk of immunity
loss. She can negotiate with B for a reduction in the price of
the loan to compensate her for assuming the risk of immunity
loss. The reduction in the price of credit is equal to the cost of
insurance (the premium) A incurs to insure herself against the
risk of immunity loss. The amount of the premium equals A's
expected immunity loss (probability of loss multiplied by the
magnitude of loss).'
Suppose that A can only acquire one type of defense, and
that if it occurs, it .would reduce the value of her bargain by
$1000. A will demand a reduction in the price she pays for
credit equal to $1000 (the value of the defense) times the probability that she will acquire the defense, times the probability
that she will not be able to shift the loss arising from the defense to B or C.145 A calculates the probability that she will
not be able to shift nonperformance loss to either B or C based
on two factors: the probability of B's insolvency and the probability that C will be immune to A's claims and defenses."4
Recall that C purchases A's obligation from B. As part of this
transaction, C considers the possibility that A will be able to
escape liability on her obligation due to a defense she may

14 If it is cheaper than paying A to assume the risk of immunity loss (by

way of a reduction in the price of credit), B will obtain third party insurance for
A against the risk of immunity loss. For example, B could arrange for another
party to guarantee his performance. If the probability that the third party
would become insolvent is lower than the probability that B would become
insolvent, A's expected immunity loss and the price reduction she will demand
declines. If the decline in the price A pays for credit (if she assumes the risk) is
greater than the cost to B of obtaining the guarantee, B will have an incentive
to purchase third party insurance.
1" Expressed as a formula, A's expected immunity loss equals L(PC x PU),
where L --' the value of the defense; PC = the probability that A will acquire the

defense; and PU = the probability that A will not be able to shift the loss to B
or somebody else.
"l Expressed as a formula: PU = PF x PI where PF = the probability that
B will be insolvent, and PI = the probability that the transferee (C) will be
immune. If B is solvent, then A will not bear immunity loss. A will not care
whether C is immune because A 'an shift nonperformance loss to B. Even if B
is insolvent, A will not bear immunity loss if B transfers his obligation to a
non-immune party because A can shift nonperformance loss to the non-immune
party. The probability that a non-immune party would be insolvent would only
be relevant as to A's ability to recover for affirmative claims.
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acquire against B, thus reducing the value of the obligation to
C. 147 Loss due to B's nonperformance that A can shift to C is
the inverse of A's immunity loss ("nonimmunity loss"). In the
hypothetical case, A and C divide the total expected loss due to
A's acquisition of a claim or defense and B's inability to answer
for it ("total expected immunity loss")
according to the respective probabilities that each will bear it. C can insure
against nonimmunity loss but will demand that B reduce the
price of A's obligation by an amount equal to C's cost of insurance (expected nonimmunity loss). 4 '
By demanding compensation from B during the course of
negotiating the respective underlying transactions, A and C
each in essence insure at B's expense against the risk of immunity/non-immunity loss. In A's case, she will demand a reduction in the price of credit. In C's case, he will demand a discount off the purchase price of A's obligation. The amount of
compensation each party demands will be equal to the cost
each party incurs to insure against the risk of loss incurred,
that is the expected immunity or nonimmunity loss, as the case
may be. The greater the probability that A will bear immunity
loss, the higher the premium to insure against it, and the more
compensation A will require from B to assume the risk. Conversely, C will demand more compensation from B as the probability that he will bear nonimmunity loss increases. 50

147Perhaps the most important factor in the value of Contract 2 to C is A's
creditworthiness. When C purchases A's obligation from B without recourse to

B, C assumes the risk that A will not be able to perform her obligation to
repay B ("credit loss"). C assumes the risk of credit loss even if A never acquires a claim or defense, and regardless of B's solvency. In other words, the
risk that C will bear credit loss is unaffected by immunity rules.
14' Expected immunity loss plus expected non-immunity loss equals total
expected immunity loss. Expressed as a formula, total expected immunity loss
equals L(PC x PF).
149 Expressed as a formula, C's expected nonimmunity loss equals L(PC x
PF x (1 - P)). Assuming that L = $1000, PC = 70%, PF = 40% and PI = 90%,

then E(LC) = $252. This is the amount that C will demand from B as a discount off the face value of A's obligation to compensate C for assuming the risk
of L.
"o Suppose that at the time B enters into Contract 1, he has not transferred A's obligation to C or anyone else. When A is uncertain as to whether B
will transfer A's obligation at all, A takes into consideration, in addition to the
factors outlined above, the possibility that B will be insolvent and not have
transferred the obligation. This additional consideration changes the earlier
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The foregoing analysis reveals the factors that A and C consider regarding their respective risks of bearing immunity or
non-immunity loss. The applicable rule of immunity is but one
factor in the calculation. In a given situation, other factors may
(and in reality probably do) dwarf the importance of a rule of
immunity. For example, if A believes that B will not become
insolvent, A will'conclude that she will always be able to recover the value of her defense from B. Thus, a rule of immunity
would have no impact.15 ' Similarly, if A believes that B will
likely become insolvent but not have transferred A's obligation,
an immunity rule would have no impact. In this scenario, C is
out of the picture. Thus A's hypothetical ability to recover the
value of her defense from a third party (as expressed in an
immunity rule) would be irrelevant. Conversely, if A believes
the probability that B will become insolvent and have transferred the obligation to a third party is high, then the applicable immunity rule becomes relatively more significant. With the
current instability among financial institutions, obligors,
obligees and the FDIC may become increasingly more sensitive
to the possibility of bank failure and FDIC involvement, there-

formula slightly: A's expected immunity loss now equals L(PC x PF(1 - PT) +
PF(PT x PI)), where PT = the probability that B will transfer A's obligation.
Suppose L = $1000, PC = 70%, PF = 40%, PT = 60%, PI = 10%. E(L) = $128.80.
Under these assumptions, the probability that B will be insolvent but not have
transferred A's obligation is 11.2%. The probability that B will both be insolvent
and have transferred the obligation to an immune party is only 2.4%. Of the
total premium A will demand ($128.80), $112 is attributable to the probability

that B will be insolvent but not have transferred A's obligation. The balance of
$16.80 is attributable to the probability that B will transfer A's obligation to an
immune party.
Where A is not certain that B will transfer A's obligation at the time Contract 1 is formed, A may overestimate or underestimate the likelihood that B
will transfer his obligation. If A does so, he may demand a premium which
either overcompensates or undercompensates him for assuming the risk. B

absorbs the cost of overcompensating A and enjoys the benefit of undercompensating A A's uncertainty as to whether B will transfer A's obligation does not
inure to the benefit or detriment of C. If and when B does transfer A's obligation, C calculates his expected loss the same way as he did in the simple
example. C is certain that B will transfer A's obligation, and certain that B will

transfer it to him. Continuing the assumptions made in the previous paragraph,
at the time of B's transfer of A's obligation to him, C would nonetheless demand a discount of $252 off the face value of A's obligation.
..A's expected immunity loss will approach zero as the probability that B
will become insolvent approaches zero.
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by increasing the relative importance of an immunity rule in
their transactions. Thus, the task at hand is to select the optimal rule of immunity for efficiently allocating loss between A
and C.
The cornerstone of economic analysis is the premise that
private agreements between parties will generally produce efficient results.1 52 A and C are unlikely to be able to allocate
efficiently immunity loss by a private agreement because the
cost of negotiation is likely to overshadow the benefits."' A is
primarily concerned with B's performance and C is primarily
concerned with A's performance. As to these aspects of the
transaction, the benefits of negotiation are much higher and
probably are worth the cost. Intervention in the form of a rule
of law is economically justified only when the parties fail to
achieve an efficient result on their own.'" In such situations,
an efficient rule of law brings about an allocation of resources
like that the parties would have reached on their own in the
absence of market failure.
As a threshold matter, any clear rule of immunity, regardless
of its content, would increase efficiency over the state of affairs
where the immunity of a transferee is random. An immunity
rule provides certainty, which reduces transaction costs. 1 55 To
the extent that an immunity rule yields a predictable outcome,
it enables the parties more accurately to quantify their expected immunity (or nonimmunity) loss. Certainty of outcome, regardless of what the outcome is, makes the transaction more
valuable to the parties to it.
An efficient rule of immunity is one that places liability on
the party better able either to avoid the loss or to insure
against it. Richard Posner gives the following example to illustrate the distinction between prevention and insurance as methods of minimizing loss:

252 POSNER, supra note 140, at 9-10.
153 See id.
See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 13, at 68.
"Transaction
costs" are the costs associated with reaching a market
transaction, including without limitation, the costs of finding and learning about
the party one wishes to deal with, conducting negotiations, monitoring performance and enforcing the bargain in the event of nonperformance. See Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
'
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Suppose I agree to supply someone with 1000 widgets by
July 1; my factory burns to the ground; and I cannot procure widgets from anyone else in time to fulfill the contract. Suppose further that there was no way in which I
could have anticipated or prevented the' fire .... A loss
that can be averted by an expenditure smaller than the
expected loss is preventable, but not all losses are preventable in this sense; the fire that destroyed the factory ...
was assumed not to be. It may be possible through insurance, however, to reduce the costs created by the risk of
loss. The insured exchanges the possibility of loss for a
smaller, but certain cost (the insurance premium).'
Using this example, an efficient rule would allocate the loss
caused by the fire to the seller if the seller could have insured
against the risk of loss from the fire more cheaply than the
buyer. The costs of insurance can be divided into two categories: (1) measurement costs; and (2) transaction costs. Measurement costs are costs associated with determining the expected
loss, i.e., the probability that the risk will occur and the magnitude of the loss if it does occur. The primary transaction cost is
that of pooling the risk with other risks.'57 The seller is likely
the cheaper insurer against loss due to a'fire in her own factory because, generally speaking, she can acquire information
about both the likelihood and magnitude of loss more cheaply
than the buyer.
If an immunity rule imposes liability on only A or C, the
other will have no incentive to avoid or insure against the risk
of loss. This problem has been dubbed the "paradox of compensation" which afflicts no-fault or strict liability rules.' Where
more than one party can take precautions or acquire insurance,
an efficient liability rule will provide an incentive for any party
who can to do so to the extent that such party can do so more
cheaply than non-liable parties. Fault-based liability rules, for
example, encourage one party to take precaution to avoid liabil-

15
-

POSNER, supra note 140, at 103.
POSNER, supra note 140, at 104-05.
See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 13, at 74; Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort,

Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1985).
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ity to the extent of the legal standard of fault, and the other
party to take precaution to avoid residual liability.' 59
Whether a liability rule yields an aggregate reduction of loss
sufficient to justify it turns on an analysis of empirical data
measuring the elasticity of precaution with respect to liabiity.'" A rule that imposes liability will reduce loss only to the
extent that parties actually modify their behavior in response to
it. A rule that has no effect on loss-reducing behavior has no
economic justification. The parties' responsiveness to rules of
liability depends on the parties' knowledge of the rule and their
respective abilities to take the rule into consideration when
fashioning their behavior.
V. THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE RULE EFFICIENTLY
ALLOCATES LOSS
The essence of the holder in due course rule is that a transferee of an obligation who is a holder in due course is immune
from all competing claims of ownership of and virtually all
defenses to the' obligation. Immunity depends on whether the
transferee can pass two tests. First, the transferee must qualify
for holder in due course status. Second, the particular defense
asserted against the transferee must be among those against
which a holder in due course is immune.
To pass the first test and attain the exalted status of holderin due course is no easy task. Under U.C.C. § 3-302, a transfer16 2
ee must: (1) be a holder; 16 ' (2) of a negotiable instrument;

See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 13, at 74.
Id. at 75; Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An
Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443, 487-90
"'

(analyzing empirical evidence of the impact of a liability rule on the conduct of
psychotherapists).
161 "Holder' with respect to a negotiable instrument, means the person in
possession if the instrument is payable to bearer or, in the case of an instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified person is in possession."
U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1990). As to the distinction between "order paper" and

"bearer paper," see ROBERT S. WHITE & JAMES J. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 561-643 (3d ed. 1988).
"1 The term "negotiable instrument" includes only signed writings that
order or promise the payment of money. U.C.C. § 3-104, cmt. 1 (1990). U.C.C.
§ 3-104 contains a more liberal definition of "sum certain" than that contained
in the 1978 Official Text. The definition of a negotiable instrument in the 1990
Official Text to encompasses a variable interest rate instrument. U.C.C. §§ 3-
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(3) acquired for "value;" 8 (4) "in good faith;"'

and (5) with-

out notice of claims or defenses.' If any one of these attributes is lacking, the transferee cannot be a holder in due course.
Even if a transferee can satisfy the foregoing requirements, he
cannot be a holder in due course if he acquired the obligation
under circumstances generally described as outside the ordinary
course of the obligee's business. 16' Each prerequisite is a significant limitation on the ability of a transferee to become a
holder in due course, and thus, on the transferee's immunity
from the obligor's claims and defenses.
The efficiency justification underlying these technical requirements for holder in due course status is not apparent at first
blush. Indeed, commercial law treatises present the requirements as a matter of rote. 167 But the requirements can be
justified as serving the efficiency goal of allocating loss to the
party who had a better opportunity to either avoid the loss or
insure against it. The component parts of the holder in due
course rule further several efficiency goals. Some requirements
reduce uncertainty regarding the probability of immunity loss
for both parties, thus reducing both parties' costs of insuring
against it. -Other requirements place liability for loss on the

104(a), 3-112(b), § 3-112 cmt. 1 (1990). U.C.C. § 3-104(d) makes it clear that if

the document in question contains a conspicuous statement that it is not
negotiable when it comes into the possession of a holder, then no holder can
attain the status of a holder in due course.
'8

U.C.C. § 3-303 (1990).

16 U.C.C. § 3-302(aX2Xii) (1990).
"s Under U.C.C. § 3-302 (aX2) (1990), the holder must acquire the instrument "without notice that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or
has been altered ... without notice of any claim to the instrument, described in
Section 3-306" and "without notice that any part has a defense or claim in
recoupment described in Section 3-305(a)." Furthermore, the instrument may
not "bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or [be] otherwise so
irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity." U.C.C. § 3302(aXl) (1990).
" "A holder does not become a holder in due course of an instrument: (i)
by legal process or by purchase in an execution, bankruptcy, or creditor's sale of
similar proceeding;, or (ii) by purchase as part of a bulk transaction not in the
ordinary course of the transferor, or (iii) as the successor in interest to an

estate or other organization." U.C.C. § 3-302(c) (1990). This is the provision

which, among others, prevents the FDIC from attaining holder in due course
status under state law when it acquires the assets of a failed bank as part of a
purchase and assumption transaction.
1" See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 161, at 551-52.
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party who could have prevented or insured against it more

cheaply.
The requirement that A's obligation be in negotiable form
before anyone can be a holder in due course of it reduces uncertainty about the probability that A's obligation will fall into
the hands of an immune party. The requirement provides a
bright line test for determining the probability of immunity loss
and reduces both parties' costs of insurance. Return to the
imaginary transaction among A, B, and C. Suppose.A executes
her obligation to B in the form of a non-negotiable instrument.
Under the holder in due course rule, A's use of a non-negotiable
instrument eliminates any probability that A's obligation will
fall into the hands of an immune party. Because A knows he
will never bear immunity loss, he will not expend resources
negotiating 'with B for compensation to insure against it. Conversely, C knows that he can never be a holder in due course of
A's obligation and will demand compensation from B equal to
his expected nonimmunity loss. Any rule that A, B, and C can
easily apply to determine the likelihood that an obligation will
fall into the hands of an immune party enhances efficiency by
reducing costs. "Negotiability" is not essential; a rule that requires an obligation to be printed on red paper in order to cut
6ff claims or defenses would do, the trick. Notwithstanding, the
arbitrary and arcane aspects of negotiability, it provides an
effective, bright line test. Whether an obligation is negotiable or
not is a relatively simple determination, which yields a remarkably certain outcome."s
The holder in due course rule's requirement that the transferee have no notice of a claim or defense 69 allocates loss to
the party as between A and C who could have insured against
it more cheaply. At the time A negotiated with B regarding A's
obligation, A could only estimate the probability that he would
have a claim or defense and the magnitude of such claim or
defense. If when C negotiates with B to acquire A's obligation,
C has no notice that A has a claim or defense against B, C is
in virtually the same position as A was in. C must estimate the

l' The key to maximizing the efficiency of a particular legal rule is to

make it inexpensive to apply and interpret. The rules governing negotiability
epitomize the efficiency associated with certainty.
19 See supra -note 165.
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likelihood that A will acquire a claim or defense and the magnitude of such claim or defense. If C has no notice of a claim or
defense, then, arguably A remains the cheaper insurer because
A probably is better able to acquire information about the likelihood and magnitude of his own loss. But, when C has notice
that A has a claim or defense when C acquires A's obligation
from B, C's access to information regarding the likelihood and
magnitude of A's loss is better than A's was, that is, C knows
with certainty the likelihood of A's loss. 7 ' Because when C
negotiates with B, he has more information about the probability of performance loss occurring (it has or is certain to occur),
he is the cheaper insurer against it. 7 '
Under the holder in due course rule, C cannot be immune if
he acquires A's obligation at a judicial sale or by legal process,
in taking over an estate, or as part of a bulk transaction outside the ordinary course of B's business.' 2 Again the requirement imposes the loss on the party who could have insured
against it more cheaply. A calculates his expected immunity
loss by taking into account, among other things, the probability
that B will transfer A's obligation to a third party. A will bear
immunity loss if either B becomes insolvent and has not transferred A's obligation, or B becomes insolvent and B transferred
A's obligation to an immune party. 73 Suppose that at the
time A enters into Contract 1 with B, A is uncertain whether B
will transfer the obligation at all. Presumably, A can determine
relatively easily the likelihood that B will transfer A's obligation in the ordinary course of B's business. But A is less able to

170Notice of a claim or defense deprives a transferee of immune status only

if the transferee receives it "at a time and in a manner that gives a reasonable
opportunity to act on it." U.C.C. § 3-302(f) (1990). Thus, if a transferee acquires
notice of a claim or defense after concluding negotiations with B, the notice
comes too late. In such a circumstance, C's ability to insure against the loss

was no better than A's.
...C's additional information about the probability that performance loss
will occur (it is certain to occur), reduces his measurement costs relative to A.

See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
72U.C.C. § 3-302(c) (1990). C could acquire the rights of a holder in due

course by virtue of the shelter principle if B was a holder in due course. U.C.C.
§ 3-302(c) cmt. 4 (1990).
1.

A's expected immunity loss equals L(PC x PF(1-PT) + PF(PT x PI))

where PT = the probability that B will transfer A's obligation. See supra note

145.
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determine the likelihood that B will transfer it outside the
ordinary course of B's business, such as at a judicial sale or in
a bulk transfer. For C, on the other hand, the fact of such
transfer is certain. The additional information C has at the
time he negotiates with B makes him the cheaper insurer. 4
The requirement that a transferee be a "holder" can be justified in the same way. A "holder" with respect to a negotiable
instrument "means the person in possession of the instrument
is payable to bearer or, in the case of an instrument payable to
an identified person, if the identified person is in possession."1 75 For example, if an instrument in the form of order
paper has not been indorsed to the transferee, he cannot be a
holder of it. 178 Returning to the hypothetical parties, transfer

to C of order paper without B's indorsement is the type of extraordinary transaction which A cannot accurately anticipate.
But C, by examining the instrument embodying the obligation,
can detect the absence of an appropriate endorsement. Again,
the availability of this information to C makes him the cheaper
insurer.
C's superior ability to avoid loss underlies the requirement
that C must give "value" before he can qualify as a holder in
due course. 17 The meaning of the term "value" as it is used
in Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. is different from the meaning
of the same term used elsewhere in the Code." 8 The definition of "value" for holder in due course purposes is narrower
than the concept of consideration. Stated generally, a transferee
gives "value" only to the extent that he performs the agreed
upon consideration or otherwise makes an irrevocable commitment to a party other than his transferor. A transferee who has
given only an executory promise in consideration for the obligation has not given "value" and, therefore, cannot be a holder in
174This transactional requirement can also be explained based on an
anecdotal observation that obligations transferred under extraordinary circumstances are more likely to be subject to claims and defenses. To the extent this
assumption is valid, then the requirement can also be justified under the same
logic as the requirement that the transferee acquire the instrument without
notice of a- claim or defense. See supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
'75

U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1990), supra note 161.

176 See U.C.C. § 3-201(b) (1990).
'77 U.C.C. §§ 3-302(aX2Xi), 3-303 (1990).
178See U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (1990) (definition of "value" for all purposes other
than with respect to negotiable instruments and bank collections).
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due course.179 If C has only promised to pay B for A's obligation, he can offset any nonimmunity loss he sustains as a result of A's claim or defense against B by refusing to perform
part or all of his executory promise. If C is immune, however,
A would be left with a loss in value which she could not recover from B..
The status of the transferee as a holder in due course does
not provide him with immunity to all defenses."W Like the
technical prerequisites to holder in due course status, the distinction between those defenses against which a holder in due
course is or is not immune has traditionally been presented as
a matter of rote."' But the distinction can be understood at
least in part on efficiency grounds.
U.C.C. § 3-305 does not list the defenses against which a
holder in due course is not immune. Rather, they are defined
by exclusion."l 2 A holder in due course is vulnerable to the so
called "real defenses," which are: "(i) infancy of the obligor to
the extent it is a defense to a simple contract; (ii) duress, lack
of legal capacity, or illegality of the transaction which, under
other law, nullifies the obligation of the obligor; (iii) fraud that
induced the obligor to sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to learn of its character or its
essential terms; (iv) discharge of the obligor in insolvency proceedings."'
Whether a defense is "real" and therefore valid against a
holder in due course is only significant if the transferee otherwise qualifies for holder in due course status. If the transferee

179 U.C.C. § 3-303 cmt. 2 (1990).

180 U.C.C. § 3-305(1) (1990).
151 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 161, at 573.
19 In U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 2 (1990), the drafters list defenses which are cut

off by holder in due course status:
[N]onissuance of the instrument, conditional issuance, and issuance for a
special purpose (Section 3-105(b)); failure to countersign a traveler's check
(Section 3-106(c)); modification of the obligation by a separate agreement
(Section 3-117); payment that violates a restrictive indorsement (Section
3-206(f)); instruments issued without consideration or for which promised
performance has not been given (Section 3-303(b)), and breach of warranty when a draft is accepted (Section 3-417(b)). The most prevalent common law defenses are fraud, misrepresentation or mistake in the issuance
of the instrument.
1"3U.C.C. § 3-305 (1990).
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qualifies, it would appear that, based on the type of obligation
and the transaction in which he acquired it, the transferee had
no better opportunity than the obligor had to avoid or insure

agairst the loss. So why should a holder in due course be vulnerable to real defenses?

The distinction between real and personal defenses, with
some exceptions,1 ' turns on whether the defense renders the
obligation void or merely voidable. In general, a defense that
would render the obligation merely voidable is invalid against a
holder in due course; a defense that would render the obligation
void, on the other hand is valid against a holder in due course.

The meaning of the terms "void" and "voidable" and the legal
distinction between them are among the great mysteries of
and the Code does not attempt to define
commercial law,'
them."s The distinction appears to be a matter of degrees. In
general, a defense renders an obligation void if it does not
appear that a contract between the parties was ever actually
formed due to an impairment of the will or judgment of the
obligor or to external illegality.187 An obligation is merely

14 The defenses of infancy and discharge in bankruptcy, are valid against a

holder in due course regardless of whether the defense would render the obligation void. Infancy is a valid defense against a holder in due course even though
it would only render the obligation voidable at the option of the infant under
state law. U.C.C. § 3-305(aXlXi) cmt. 1 (1990). The defense of discharge in
insolvency proceedings is valid against a holder in due course regardless of
whether the obligation is rendered technically void because of the discharge.
U.C.C. § 3-305(aX1Xiv) (1990). "Insolvency proceedings" is defined in U.C.C. § 1201(22) (1990).
18 Grant Gilmore described the concept of "voidable title" as it relates to
the interest of a good faith purchaser of goods as: "a vague idea, never defined
and perhaps incapable of definition, whose greatest virtue, as a principle of
growth, may well have been its shapeless imprecision of outline." See Gilmore,
supra note 2, at 1059.
" The words "void" or 'voidable" do not appear in U.C.C. § 3-305(aX1)
(1990). U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 1 states that as to the defenses of mental incompetence, guardianship, ultra vires acts or lack of corporate capacity or any incapacity other than infancy: "If under the local law the effect is to render the
instrument entirely null and void, the defense maybe asserted against a holder
in due course. If the effect is merely to render the obligation voidable at the
election of the obligor, the defense is cut off."
.8.William Hawkland observed: "Real defenses generally exist where the
negotiable instrument lacks legal efficacy at its inception." WILLIAM HAWXLAND,
COMMERCIAL PAPER (NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE) 76 (1959).
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voidable when the defect is less severe. A voidable transaction
is one where the circumstances of contracting were suspect
enough to provide the injured party with some relief, but not
sufficiently suspect to treat the contract as though it had never
been formed.18s
Whether a particular defense renders an obligation void or
merely voidable is normally not an important distinction. It
becomes important only when the perpetrator of the conduct
giving rise to the defense is insolvent or otherwise cannot answer for her conduct.' 89 Regardless of how courts have articulated and applied the concepts, the distinction between defenses
which render obligations void as opposed to voidable is actually
a means of allocating loss between two parties who are able to
take steps to prevent it.
A rule that imposes liability on a transferee for defenses that
render the obligation void creates an incentive for him to monitor the practices of transferors. He will monitor transferors'
practices to detect conduct which could give rise to such a defense. Once detected, a transferee can deter such conduct by
refusing to deal with offending transferors. Clearly, a transferee
would have a much stronger incentive if he were vulnerable to
all defenses, not just the "real" ones. But such a rule of strict
liability would eliminate the incentive on the part of the obligor
to police the practices, of the obligeettransferor.' 9 An efficient
rule imposes liability on the transferee only when he is the
lower cost avoider.

"88
Personal defenses are those which do not deny the existence of a contract between prior parties, but which assert that the contract, by reason of some act or circumstances occurring contemporaneously or subse-

quently, has become voidable or defeasible, in whole or in part, between
the original parties -

as, for example, failure or absence of consider-

ation, breach of warranty, fraud in the inducement, duress, mistake, and
the like.
Id. at 78.
"' In the law governing sales of goods, the distinction between void and
voidable title is relevant only when the goods fall into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser for value. A bona fide purchaser for value who acquires voidable title

is immune from the claims of ownership of the true owner. A bona fide purchaser who acquires only void title (for example, from a thief) holds the goods
subject to the claims of the true owner. U.C.C. § 2-403 (1990).
190 See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
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The exception from holder in due course immunity for the
real defenses is efficient if it allocates liability between the
holder in due course and the obligor according to their relative
costs of precaution. Both A and C can take precautions against
nonperformance loss. For example, if B has a reputation for
defrauding customers, A and C can refuse to deal with her. For
both A and C, the cost of taking such precaution involves the
cost of obtaining information regarding B's reputation, and
searching out a substitute for B if B is unacceptable.
For conduct giving rise to personal defenses, A's costs of
precaution are generally lower than C's. But, as to real defenses, due to A's extremely high cost of precaution, C is probably
able to prevent B's misconduct at a lower cost than A can.
Return to the hypothetical parties, A, B and C. Suppose B
tricks A into signing a negotiable instrument by telling A that
it is a letter to the governor, exploiting the fact that A cannot
read. B then sells A's note to C, who qualifies as a holder in
due course. Unless A's defense of fraud is a real defense, C will
be immune. For A to prevail against C, A must establish that:
(1) B's misrepresentation induced his signature; (2) that A did
not know the "essential terms" of the instrument; and (3) that
A had no "reasonable opportunity" to gain such knowledge.1"'
In essence, A must establish that his cost of precaution was
extremely high. To avoid the loss, he would have had to employ
"unreasonable" means to gain knowledge about the terms of the
document he signed. 92
In this situation, C's cost of precaution is probably lower

'1 U.C.C. § 3-305(aXlXiii) (1990); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 161 at

573. U.C.C. § 3-305 cmt. 1 (1990) states:

The test of the defense here §tated is that of excusable ignorance of the
contents of the writing signed. The party must not only have been in
ignorance, but must also have had no reasonable opportunity to obtain
knowledge. In determining what is a reasonable opportunity all relevant
factors are to be taken into account, including the age and sex of the
party, his intelligence, education and business experience; his ability to
read or to understand English, the representations made to him and his
reason to rely on them or to have confidence in the person making them;
the presence or absence of any third person who might read or explain
the instrument to him, or any other possibility of obtaining independent
information; and the apparent necessity, or lack of it, for acting without
delay.
1" See, e.g., FDIC v. Turner, 869 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989).
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than A's. Even though as to this transaction C might not be
able to prevent A's loss any.cheaper than A could, C may be
the cheaper developer over time of a means of detecting and
deterring B's dishonest conduct. A is likely to deal with B only'
once, not as part of an ongoing commercial relationship. C, as a
purchaser of obligations due to B, is more likely to deal with B
on a repeat basis. Because the volume of C's business with B*is
likely to far exceed that of As, C is likely to be more responsive to a rule of immunity that imposes liability on C for losses
due to real defenses. C is likely to respond to such a rule by
developing a means of policing B's business to detect conduct
giving rise to a real defense. 3 In any event, C is likely to be
able to pool and spread the risk of loss due to real defenses at
a lower cost than A.
VI. TOWARD AN EFFICIENT RULE OF IMMUNITY FOR THE FDIC

The three sources of the FDIC's immunity overlap with differences at the margin. The scope of each source of immunity is
different from the others, and the differences themselves vary
among the federal circuits. It is impossible to articulate in a
workable form a single immunity rule that harmonizes all three
sources as the courts have interpreted them. This section proposes an efficient rule of immunity for the FDIC, which shall
be referred to as the FDIC immunity rule.
Under the FDIC immunity rule, the FDIC would be immune
from a defense if two requirements are satisfied: (1) the asset
-on which the FDIC sues contains a written promise to pay
money that is unconditional with respect to the claim or defense alleged; and (2) the FDIC acquired the asset in one of its
statutory capacities (as receiver or FDIC-Corporate). Once eligible, the FDIC would be immune from all claims and defenses
except those which would render the obligation void as opposed
to voidable.
The first requirement to qualify for immune status - that
the obligation be a written promise to pay money and at least
unconditional with respect to the defense alleged - blends the

1' A party's responsiveness to liability and ability to develop a method of
precaution are factors which bear on efficient allocation of loss. See Cooter &
Rubin, supra note 13, at 76.
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disparate requirements of the three sources of immunity into a
single requirement with respect to the form of the obligation
(the "form requirement"). Under the FDIC immunity rule, the
obligation at issue need not be in negotiable form or be completely unconditional. The bank's records regarding the obligation must, however, reflect that the obligation is unconditional
with respect to the particular claim or defense alleged.
Conditionality of obligations is measurable on a continuum.
Obligations that meet the technical requirements for negotiability under U.C.C. § 3-104 are at the extremely unconditional
end, and bilateral contracts with interdependent obligations are
at the extremely conditional end.'" The three sources of immunity tolerate different levels of conditionality with respect to
the obligation at issue. At one extreme, in the case of the federal holder in due course rule, the asset must be a negotiable
instrument, and the FDIC may nbt have "actual knowledge" of
a claim or defense at the time it acquires it.' 95 Toward the
other extreme, under U.C.C. § 1823(e), the asset may be completely conditional, provided that the defense asserted does not
meet the recordation requirements of U.C.C. § "1823(e).' Perhaps at the most conditional extreme, the D'Oench doctrine
merely requires that the agreement underlying the alleged
defense be "secret" and that the form of the obligation "tend to
mislead" bank examiners.' 97 The FDIC immunity rule sets the
required unconditionality of the obligation somewhere in the
middle of the conditionality continuum. Although the obligation
need not be in negotiable form, it must be in the form of a

"9 The U.C.C. recognizes this continuum by adopting different definitions of
"instrument" for purposes of Article 3 (governing negotiable instruments) and
Article 9 (governing secured transactions). As used in Article 3, "instrument"
means a negotiable instrument meeting the requirements of U.C.C § 3-104
(1990). As used in Article 9, "instrument" means a negotiable instrument or "a
certificated security (defined in U.C.C.§ 8-102) or any other writing which
evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment." U.C.C. § 9105(i) (1990). Article 3 negotiable instruments are a subset of Article 9 instruments, and only Article 3 instruments can fall into the hands of an immune

party.

195E.g.,

Montross, 923 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1991).

196 E.g., Gulf Life, 737 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1984).
'97

See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
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written promise to pay money. Furthermore, either the obligation must be unconditional or the alleged condition giving rise
to the defense must not appear among the express conditions to
liability. For example, if an obligation is in the form of a prom-issory note (that is, an unconditional promise to pay money)
but is not technically negotiable because it does not contain the
words "to order" or "to bearer," it would meet the FDIC immunity rule form requirement.... If the obligation were to pay
rent under a lease, it would meet the FDIC immunity rule form
requirement if the particular defense was that the bank agreed
to accept rent of $1000 even though an express term in the
lease set the rent at $5000.
The requirement that the FDIC acquire the obligation either
as receiver or in its corporate capacity is comparatively straightforward. This requirement circumscribes the scope of the
rule by describing the particular factual circumstance in which
it applies. In all other circumstances, under ordinary state law,
that is, the holder in due course rule, would apply.
As to the second part of the FDIC immunity rule, once the
FDIC qualifies for immune status, it takes free of all claims
and defenses except those which would render the obligation
void as opposed to voidable.
In part V, this Article explored the efficiency justifications
underlying the allocation of loss embodied in the holder in due
course rule. Stated simply, in certain circumstances, a transferee of an obligation is in a better position to reduce loss than
the obligor, and in those situations, the transferee is not immune from the obligor's claims and defenses. Starting with the
reasonable assumption that the holder in due course rule efficiently allocates loss, the next step is to determine whether the
FDIC immunity rule changes the allocation of loss which the
holder in due course rule would accomplish. To the extent the
FDIC immunity rule changes the allocation of loss, it is necessary to determine whether the new allocation is efficient.
Consider how an obligor's behavior changes if he must consider the impact of the holder in due course rule plus the FDIC
immunity rule in determining his expected immunity loss. The
FDIC immunity rule increases an obligor's expected immunity
loss in two ways. First, it grants the FDIC immunity when the

19 See U.C.C. § 3-104(lXc) (1990).
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obligation at issue would not satisfy the form requirements of
the holder in due course rule. Second, the FDIC immunity rule
grants the FDIC immunity when the transaction in which the
FDIC acquires the obligation would not satisfy the transaction
requirement of the holder in due course rule.
To illustrate the effect of the FDIC immunity rule's less
restrictive form requirement, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose X borrows money from Y. In determining his expected immunity loss, X will take into consideration the probabilities that: (1) he will acquire a claim or defense against Y;
(2) that Y will become insolvent; and (3) that Y will transfer
X's obligation to an immune party.199 The probabilities that X
will acquire a claim or defense and that Y will become insolvent are no different under the FDIC immunity rule than under the holder in due course rule, but the third probability is
affected.
Suppose Y is a finance company and X's obligation is not in
negotiable form. Because his obligation is not in negotiable
form, under the holder in due course rule X knows that no one
can become a holder in due course of it. The probability that Y
will transfer his obligation to an immune party is zero, and X's
expected immunity loss is zero.2" Now suppose, all other
things remaining the same, that Y is a federally insured bank.
Under the FDIC immunity rule, the FDIC could become a
transferee who would be immune from unrecorded claims and
defenses to an obligation, even a non-negotiable one.2 ' Thus,
when X borrows from a federally insured bank using a nonnegotiable instrument, he faces expected immunity loss attributable solely to the FDIC immunity rule.2" Under the FDIC
immunity rule, the FDIC can achieve immunity by acquiring an
obligation outside the ordinary course of the bank's business,
i.e., in a purchase and assumption transaction, even though
under the holder in due course rule, such an extraordinary
course buyer would not be immune. 2 3 This expanded immuni-

200

See discussion supra note 146 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra note 146 and accompanying text.

20

See discussion supra Part VI.

199

2°An obligor faces such loss when she uses a negotiable instrument
because the FDIC can achieve immune status even though it does not acquire
the obligation in an ordinary course transaction. See aupra Part VI.
2o See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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ty for the FDIC creates an additional increment of loss beyond
the expected loss associated with the holder in due course rule.
The efficiency considerations that justify the allocation of loss
under the holder in due course rule justify the allocation of loss
between the FDIC and an obligor under the FDIC immunity
rule. The FDIC immunity rule imposes liability for defenses on
the FDIC only when it is able to avoid or insure against the
loss more cheaply than the obligor. Return to the hypothetical
loan between X and Y where Y is a federally insured bank.
Suppose X executes a note under which he agrees to repay Y
provided Y continues funding the loan at agreed intervals. Y
fails and the FDIC acquires Xs note. X wants to assert against
the FDIC a defense based on Y's fraudulent misrepresentation
of certain facts. Xs defense is not based on Y's failure to fund
according to the agreement, but rather on breach of an "unrecorded" agreement regarding the truthfulness of certain facts.
X's note would not be negotiable because his promise to pay is
expressly conditional. Under the holder in due course rule, a
transferee of it would be subject to X's defense. 2 4 Under the
FDIC immunity rule, however, the FDIC would not be subject
to X's defense if it acquired the obligation in a purchase and
assumption transaction because the bank's records do not contain a condition on the obligation supporting the particular
defense X alleges. Is there an efficiency justification for immunizing the FDIC in this case when an ordinary transferee
would not be immune? Again, the answer to this question depends on the parties' relative costs of measuring and pooling
their risk.
The FDIC immunity rule form requirement combines the
allocative functions of the holder in due course rule's negotiability and notice requirements. The FDIC immunity rule contains
a more liberal unconditionality requirement than that of negotiability. But it imposes a more restrictive lack of notice requirement than that under the holder in due course rule. At
the heart of the concept of negotiability is the requirement that
the obligation be in writing, and contain an unconditional promise or order to pay money.0 5 If an obligation contains conditions on the promise to pay, for example, it is not negotiable

214 U.C.C. § 3-302 (1990).

U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (1990).
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and will always be subject to all of the obligor's defenses. Even
if the obligation is negotiable, a transferee cannot be a holder
in due course of it if, generally speaking, she has actual knowledge of a claim or defense or constructive knowledge of an
irregularity that could have been gained by examining the
instrument.2 °
Under the FDIC immunity rule, the FDIC will be immune
only if the obligation is a written promise to pay money and
the bank's records of the loan transaction contain no condition
with respect to the defense alleged." 7 In other words, the
FDIC can be immune to a defense to a conditional (non-negotiable) obligation provided that the bank's records do not provide
it with notice of the possibility of the type of defense alleged. If
the bank's records reflect that the obligation is conditional with
respect to the defense alleged, even the FDIC is not immune.
Recall that the holder in due course requirement of negotiability provides both the obligor and the transferee with a bright
line test for determining in advance the likelihood that a transferee will be immune to a claim or defense. 0 8 The FDIC immunity rule requirement regarding the conditionality of the
obligation provides less certainty than that provided by the
requirement of negotiability. On the other hand, the notice
component of the FDIC immunity rule is arguably more certain
than the notice requirement under the holder in due course
rule. Under the FDIC immunity rule, the transferee's subjective
knowledge and good faith are irrelevant, whereas these facts
are germane to a determination of "notice" under the holder in
due course rule. 2' These subjective factors make the holder
in due course rule less certain in outcome than the FDIC immunity rule.2 10 On balance, the FDIC immunity rule may not
be any less certain in outcome than the holder in due course
rule. The current state of the law governing the FDIC's immunity, however, permits substantially more uncertainty than the
proposed FDIC immunity rule. 11 Reformation of the current

2w See supra note 120 and accompanying
Blum, supra note 116, at 234-40.
See supra Part VI, at 269.
See supra note 168 and accompanying
'o See U.C.C. §§ 3-302(aX2Xii), 1-201(19)
210 See Coater & Rubin supra note 13, at
211 See supra, Part III(D).

text. U.C.C. § 3-302(aX2) (1990);

text.
(1990).
78.
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la*' to reduce uncertainty in the application of the FDIC's immunity would increase efficiency by reducing transaction costs.
Now consider whether the FDIC immunity rule allocates loss
efficiently. To the extent that he can acquire information about
the types of probable performance loss in his transaction more
cheaply than the FDIC can, the obligor should, and under the
FDIC immunity rule does, bear immunity loss. An obligor bears
'immunity loss if he does not identify in the bank's records
possible sources of nonperformance loss as express conditions to
his obligation to pay. The FDIC immunity rule induces an obligor to reduce the risk of immunity loss by fully documenting
every possible claim or defense. But, the obligor and bank will
only document possible claims and defenses to the extent that
the marginal cost of doing so is less than the marginal benefit.2" The marginal benefit of documentation is equal to the
marginal reduction in expected federal immunity loss.213 To
the extent that the marginal cost of further, documentation
exceeds the marginal benefit,2 14 the obligor will execute an
obligation without completely recording all defenses and insure
against the residual risk of immunity loss at the bank's expense.215
When the insured bank's records reflect an express condition
on an obligation giving rise to a defense, both the obligor and
the FDIC have identical access to information about the types
of performance loss for which a transferee will not be immune
it appears in the banks records. So why should the FDIC
bear the loss? The FDIC's mechanism for insuring against the
21 For a discussion of some of the costs of writing detailed contracts see

Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An
Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979).
212 Because an obligor's expected federal immunity loss depends on the

product of a number of factors, the magnitude of other factors will affect the

marginal imp'act of increased documentation. For example, as the probability
that the bank will fail increases, the marginal impact of additional documentation on reduction of expected immunity loss will increase accordingly. This

suggests that the more precarious the financial condition of a bank, the more
.documented the conditions on the obligation will be.
214 Marginal cost of documentation is likely to exceed marginal benefit
where the probability that the obligor will acquire a claim or defense or the

probability that the obligee will be insolvent is low.
216 The additional risk of immunity loss associated with dealing with a
federally insured bank makes it relatively more costly, ceterus paribus, to

borrow from a federally insured bank than from a non-insured source.
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risk of non-immunity loss is different from that of an ordinary
transferee. Unlike a typical transferee, the FDIC cannot negotiate with the failed bank over the price of the obligation.216
Although the FDIC cannot bargain with a failed bank for a
reduction in the price of an obligation as a means of offsetting
the cost of insurance, it can offset its aggregate expected nonimmunity loss by raising the price all insured banks pay for
federal deposit insurance coverage.2 17 Because the FDIC can
pool its risk over all insured banks, it is likely to be able to
insure against its risk of loss at a cost lower than that an
obligor would incur.
If the FDIC can satisfy the form requirement of the FDIC
immunity rule, it does not lose its immune status merely because it acquired the obligation outside the ordinary course of
the transferee's business. The FDIC immunity rule relieves the
FDIC from the "ordinary course purchaser" requirement of the
holder in due course rule, but this deviation does not necessarily reduce efficiency. The holder in due course rule's ordinary
course transaction requirement is based on the notion that the
transferee is the cheaper acquirer of information as to the likelihood that the obligee will transfer the obligation outside his
ordinary course. From the obligor's perspective, the probability
of an FDIC liquidation or purchase and assumption transaction
is virtually the same as the probability that the bank will become insolvent. (If the bank fails, the FDIC will be appointed
receiver and will most likely either liquidate it and pay insured
claims or arrange a purchase and assumption transaction.) The
FDIC may be the cheaper acquirer of information regarding the
probability of the bank's insolvency by virtue of its access to
financial information as regulator. Even if this is the case, the
obligor is still probably the cheaper acquirer of all the other
information necessary for his expected loss calculation. If the
obligor's defense is not based on a part of the bank's loan records, the obligor has cheaper access than the FDIC to information about the probability that he will acquire a claim or defense and the magnitude of such claim or defense if he acquires

216 See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
21? The FDIC's ability to pool risk may result in a

tion cost component of the cost of insurance.

decrease in the transac-
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one. 21" Arguably, therefore, the obligor is the cheaper acquirer
of most of the information needed for the expected immunity
loss calculation.
Once the FDIC achieves immune status, its immunity extends to all claims and defenses that are not expressly preserved in the failed bank's official records, except defenses that
would render the obligation void. Immunity for the FDIC from
personal defenses is probably justified because the FDIC cannot
police conduct giving rise to personal defenses (like voidable
infancy) as cheaply as obligors can - the same reasoning that
justifies the validity of real defenses against a holder in due
couirse.219
V. CONCLUSION

Federal law governing the FDIC's immunity is currently a
muddle, with the outcome of a particular case turning on semantics and chance. The confusion is attributable in part to the
existence of three distinct but concurrently applicable sources of
immunity. It is also attributable to an absence of first principals guiding the courts. The absence of a coherent test for the
application of the FDIC's immunity is most apparent when the
obligation on which the FDIC seeks to recover is part of a
bilateral contract.
This article proposes that the efficient allocation of loss
should shape a rule of immunity for the FDIC. Courts applying
the current law justify immunity for the FDIC based on furtherance of redistributional goals - shifting the cost of bank
failure away from the FDIC. If the only goal of a rule of immunity for the FDIC is to redistribute loss from the federal deposit insurance fund to obligors, then a rule of absolute immunity
would be optimal. A rule that immunizes the FDIC from all

218 See

supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.

219 See supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
20 In FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1270 (6th Cir. 1985) (Merritt, dissenting) (federal policy did not mandate a shifting of the cost of bank failure from
the FDIC to obligors and that the "only certain effect [of the federal holder in
due course rule] is to redistribute the cost of bank failure from taxpayers, each
of whom bears only a small fraction of the total cost, to a small number of note
makers whose individual liability may be significant.") Accord, Miller & Meachain, supra note 8, at 633-35.
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claims and defenses simply fixes a higher value on the failed
bank's assets in the hands of the FDIC than such assets had in
the hands of the failed bank, at the expense of obligors. '
Any vulnerability of the FDIC to claims or defenses will reduce
the redistributive effect. If, on the other hand, at least part of
the objective is to induce conduct that could reduce the loss
created by bank failure - to induce allocative efficiency - a
uniform rule of absolute immunity would not necessarily do the
job. This is because in certain circumstances, the FDIC may be
able to take precaution to avoid or insure against the loss at a
lower cost than the obligor. If the FDIC were always immune,
it would have no incentive to take precaution to avoid or insure
against loss, even when it was in the better position to do so.
This article proposes a rule of immunity that deliberately
considers allocative efficiency. Like the holder in due course
rule, it allocates loss to the party who was in the better position to avoid it. The resulting rule eliminates much of the confusion and unpredictability of the current law and has the
potential to affirmatively reduce the total loss from bank failure.

"' See Montross, 923 F.2d at 357.

